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THE USSR IN CRISIS: STATE OF THE UNION

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THE USSR IN CRISIS: STATE OF THE UNION

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1991

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Washington, DC.

The Commission met in room 216 of the Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC, at 2 p.m., Steny H. Hoyer, Chairman, presiding.

Members present: Chairman Steny H. Hoyer (D–MD), Co-Chairman Dennis DeConcini (D–AZ), Edward J. Markey (D–MA), Don Ritter (R–PA), Timothy Wirth (D–CO), Wyche Fowler (D–GA), Alfonse M. D'Amato (R–NY), John Heinz (R–PA), and Malcolm Wallop (R–WY).

Also present: Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary of State.

Chairman HOYER. We are pleased to have what we believe is a very outstanding panel for today's hearing on what I personally believe, and I think others believe, is the most vital international issue confronting this country and the world, although, obviously, we are focused on the Middle East, which is also critically important.

One year ago President Gorbachev addressed the plenary meeting of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and, noting the extensive democratization and increasing political pluralism which was underway in the Soviet Union, foresaw the historic establishment of political parties.

At that time President Gorbachev appeared to be aiming for nothing less than the emancipation of the individual in society, the achievement of civic dignity.

The political atmosphere was charged with hope. Communism was withering away in a manner and at a speed no one predicted. And the cold war was, by almost everybody, declared to be over.

Although Gorbachev's words fell against a seemingly less than promising background, that of a Soviet state on the verge of economic collapse, Gorbachev's tangible political reforms gave cause for some optimism.

As Vitaly Korotich, a member of the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies, wrote in an open letter to his president, "We in the Soviet Union have never in peace time lived as badly as we do now." But he continued, "Our hopes for a better life have never been higher than they are now."

In fact, the battle for freedom and democracy is far from won.

The Soviet Government is now signaling a retreat from President Gorbachev's earlier goals and aspirations and a mistaken belief perhaps that order can be gained by destroying liberty itself.

Intimidation and force have been used to usurp the inalienable right of the people to confer power upon their government. President Landsbergis raised that in response to the invalidation order of President Gorbachev just the other day.

Order and stability are means to promote democracy and not goals for which democracy can be sacrificed. Indeed, as an Estonian parliamentarian said, the most stable place in the world is the cemetery.

In his open letter, Korotich reminded President Gorbachev that he had once interrupted a speech by Andrey Sakharov about peace and understanding. "Now," he wrote, "Sakharov is dead, and you must finish this speech and this fight for democracy."

It will take more than one man to continue Dr. Sakharov's continuous fight for human rights and other freedoms. This battle must see the pillars of totalitarianism crumbling and must be the foundation upon which human dignity will rest. No home, even the one Gorbachev speaks of, is built from the top down.

I and other Members of the Congress, members of the administration and members of the community in this country and throughout the world have expressed anger and disappointment at what has been happening in the Baltic States.

This Commission hopes to be visiting the Baltic States within the next few days. Hopefully we will leave Saturday night and go to Stockholm on Sunday and meet with parliamentarians and others interested in the Baltic issues and then fly into Riga. We have not yet received from the Soviet Union authorization to do so.

Assuming we get that authorization, we then hope to fly to Moscow on Thursday to meet with Boris Yeltsin, the head of the largest republic in the Soviet Union, who has himself had comments with respect to what is happening in the Baltic States.

It has been suggested by Fyodor Burlatsky, who heads up the Committee for the Supreme Soviet that interfaces with this Commission, that we also meet with either Mr. Lukyanov, the head of the Parliament, or Mr. Gorbachev, President of the state.

We have indicated, of course, that we would do either for the purposes of determining from both their perspectives what is going on, what the future is for the Soviet Union and how that will impact on relations between the West and the East.

It is, therefore, very appropriate that we have this hearing today and have some of the real experts in the United States give us their views on where we are, what is happening in the Soviet Union, and what it portends for the future.

We have three very, very distinguished witnesses. The first witness that we have, unfortunately, I understand, has to leave right at 2 o'clock. So we're going to get on—3 o'clock. Seeing as how it is now 20 after 2, I'm glad he's not leaving at 2.

Dr. Brzezinski is well-known to everybody in the United States and throughout the world. So we will welcome him.

Before I do that, however, I am reminded that there are other members who want to make opening statements, and I would ask that they be brief. We will include their full statements in the record at the appropriate time.

At this point in time I would like to recognize the Co-Chairman of the Commission, Senator DeConcini.

Co-Chairman DECONCINI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm going to ask that my statement be put in the record.

I think we are fortunate today, as you have said, to be holding these hearings about the crisis in the Soviet Union. And they do deal with the Baltics, but other things: military patrols in many of the republics in the major cities, the cruelty of the new ruble policy, and the increasingly serious reports of Soviet resupplying of Iraq.

I am interested in today's hearings because to myself it seems quite clear that the United States and other Western countries' governments—and I'm sorry to include ourselves in this, the United States—have developed a foreign policy, it seems, towards the Soviet Union totally around the personality of Mr. Gorbachev.

And though I must say nobody deserves the Nobel Peace Prize as much as Gorbachev did when he received it last year for what he has brought about in the area of changes in the democratic process in Europe and even in the Soviet Union, it concerns me immensely that we have focused on one individual and seem to be sacrificing now many principles that this country has stood on for so long and have, maybe even been deserving of some of the credit for the changes in the Soviet Union by standing on these principles, one administration after another, all for the protection of an individual's personality.

I would just ask, Mr. Chairman, that my statement be included in the record and add my thanks to the witnesses who are here with us today.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you, Senator.

Don Ritter, the ranking member on the House side?

Congressman RITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I also welcome our witnesses.

I believe we are witnessing some sad days inside the Soviet Union. We had thought the patient was well on the road to recovery. It looks like a somewhat dangerous relapse.

We witnessed the resurgence of Communist Party hardliners, the magnified implements of the military, the heavy industry reliance, sweeping new powers of the KGB, crackdown on the media, and glasnost in general, and, most worrisome of all, the willingness to use violence to keep the empire together. Gorbachev appears to have changed his motto to: If you can't beat them, beat on them.

And, as for Soviet foreign policy in support for our Gulf issue, the picture is less obviously bleak, but there are various intelligence reports of Soviet aid getting to Iraq, refusals of the Soviet defense establishment to abide by arms control agreements negotiated by ex-Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. These things are disturbing.

We have witnessed the transfer of some massive amounts of equipment that was to have been destroyed in the eastern regions of the USSR That's not what we had in mind in our CFE talks.

The price of the new world order will be more difficult, it seems, and more wrenching than we thought just a few months ago.

We're at an important juncture, and I would hope the expertise and the experience of our witnesses will help us in Congress to analyze how we proceed from here.

I'm continually interested in their views on establishing more and firmer ties between our government and the republics. Our mission to the Baltics and Moscow is, in part, an attempt by the Congress to build such relationships.

Mr. Chairman, I will include my full statement in the record and yield back.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you very much.

Senator Fowler?

Senator FOWLER. I'd be very happy to yield my time to Dr. Brzezinski.

Chairman HOYER. Congressman Markey?

Congressman MARKEY. Thank you, Steny. Thank you to you and——

Chairman HOYER. Dr. Brzezinski's thanks to Senator Fowler.

Congressman MARKEY [continuing]. And Senator DeConcini for having, as usual, this timely hearing.

In 30 seconds, I'd just like to say that although the most immediate concern for Americans is the military action in the Baltic States, less dramatic than military confrontation, but perhaps more worrisome as an indication of future policy shifts, is the beginning of a Soviet Government rollback from free enterprise.

For example, the recent monetary reform and the authorization for KGB inspection of foreign and jointly owned enterprises may crush any internal entrepreneurial spirit. It will certainly damage interest and credibility among Western enterprises considering doing business in the Soviet Union. The loss of these connections to the West could have serious consequences for the future political and economic structure of the republics.

And, as well, one of the greatest challenges is to promote a form of independence and self-determination for Baltic States which maintains a full commitment to democratization and full civil rights for all minorities. A further challenge is to balance that disappointment and alarm over the resurgence of repressive practices by the Soviet Government with a pressing need to move forward on arms controls. It is my hope that we would be able to meet these challenges in the coming months.

Thank you.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you, Congressman.

And last, but certainly not least, Senator Wirth?

Senator WIRTH. I want to hear Dr. Brzezinski, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.

Chairman HOYER. Some of the senators are being uncharacteristic from the House standpoint, but they're appreciated.

Senator WIRTH. Earlier training.

Chairman HOYER. Dr. Brzezinski does not need any introduction, obviously. He is now Counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Professor of American Foreign Policy at the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.

As we all know, he was the National Security Adviser to President Carter. In 1981 he was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

Doctor, we are very pleased to have you with us, and we appreciate this opportunity to hear from you.

TESTIMONY OF DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, COUNSELOR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES; PROFESSOR OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, PAUL NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just make some informal remarks. These are not from a prepared text, but from some notes that I have in front of me.

First of all, let me say that I very much welcome this hearing. I think you and the members of the Commission are addressing an issue which, very unfortunately, has been rather obscured in public recognition, particularly in America, in the course of the last several weeks.

Yet, what is happening in the Soviet Union, in my view, in some ways, may be historically more significant for the future than the painful and admittedly important regional war in which we are currently engaged. It is that regional war, however, which commands almost the totality of our public attention.

In that sense, I perceive certain unfortunate analogies to the situation that developed in 1956, when public attention was riveted on the Suez crisis and, thereby, Mr. Khrushchev gained a somewhat freer hand to deal a crushing blow to the Hungarians.

I hope this will not be the case this time. And hearings of this sort, the attention you are giving this issue, I think, are very much a corrective step in the right direction.

Nonetheless, I think we have to recognize the fact that, generally speaking, all of us in the West have been somewhat surprised and have been taken somewhat by surprise by what has happened in the Baltic Republics.

I think it is important to ask why we were taken by surprise or at least why some of us were taken by surprise. And I believe that the explanation lies largely, first, in the underestimation, the underestimation, in the West of the depth of the centrality of the national problem in the Soviet Union. We simply over the years have neglected the importance of the central reality of the problem.

And, secondly, I believe it is rooted in the misinterpretation in the West of the historical meaning of perestroika and of Mr. Gorbachev's role.

Now I would like to comment briefly on each of these two issues and then share with you some of the policy implications and recommendations that I draw from my analysis.

Very briefly on the national problems, Soviet spokesmen who come here speak to you, no doubt speak on our mass media, often like to draw analogies between the situation in the Soviet Union and the United States. Indeed, there are occasionally even hints that Mr. Gorbachev is playing the role that Mr. Lincoln played.

Of course, what this analogy overlooks is the fundamental difference between the national realities of these two countries, of the United States and of the Soviet Union.

We in the United States are ethnically or nationally diverse in terms of our origins on an individual basis. The Soviet Union is ethnically diverse on a national basis. It is as basic and as simple as that. And, yet, this difference is fundamental.

We are all, even here in this room, of a variety of origins, but we all came here as individuals or our parents did or our grandparents did and became Americans in the process of a voluntary commitment to a shared a future based on certain common constitutional principles.

The Soviet Union is fundamentally different. It is an amalgam, a political amalgam, with a variety of nations, the nations being organic units that live on their own territory and have lived on it for centuries, that have their own distinct languages and retain them, that have their own sense of history and are conscious of it, very often different religions.

And in the age of nationalism, this makes itself felt. Today in the Soviet Union, to have a national consciousness means that you are automatically almost anti-communist and anti-imperialist.

And this is a fundamental political reality that the Soviet Union cannot evade. It imposes a central dilemma, particularly for Russian democrats.

And I think Boris Yeltsin has been coping with that dilemma in a particularly courageous way because he has come closer than most to realizing that, particularly for the Russians, there is a hell of a fundamental choice. Either Russia is to be a democracy and someday it may even be prosperous or it is to be an empire and, therefore, the country inevitably has to continue in dictatorial power. And that is the historical crossroads which Russia faces today. But to recognize the reality of the national problem also means to recognize its complexity and its difficulty.

The fact of the matter is that the population in the Soviet Union is roughly divided. One hundred forty-five million are Russians. One hundred forty-five are non-Russians. About 65 million of the total, 65 million of the 290 million, live outside of their ethnic homes.

And that creates a commingling that is difficult to disaggregate. It creates ethnic tensions. It creates increasingly now refugees and ethnic violence.

And, hence, the problem is not simple and you cannot solve it instantly, simply by advocating, for example, total, undiluted, instant self-determination.

At the same time, we have to recognize that the preservation of the Soviet Union as a centralized state is only possible on the basis of coercion, and coercion makes dictatorship necessary, and that dictatorship, to protect the integrity of the Soviet Union, has to be imperialistic in nature and, therefore, suppressive to the non-Russians. This is the dilemma that anyone who thinks seriously about the future of the Soviet Union faces within the Soviet Union.

And Gorbachev not long ago confessed that for all of the problems that he has faced, this one came upon him with the greatest degree of intensity and surprise.

He admited that he had no notion when he first came into power how deep this problem was and how far from a solution it was. He had come to assume that the problem was solved.

He has never worked outside of the Russian districts. He lived in Stavropol, then Moscow. He dealt with non-Russians in Moscow who probably, by and large, were assimilated in the system, spoke

Russian, probably deferentially praised the Big Brother, and gave him a false sense that the national problem no longer existed.

And, yet, in the course of the perestroika and, particularly, the quasi-democratization that has taken place, he suddenly discovered the problem is real and that it poses ultimately the question of the very survival of the Soviet Union.

And that problem has been compounded by the difficulties of perestroika and also some of our own misunderstanding of it and of Gorbachev's own role.

If we review what Gorbachev has stood for over the last 5 or so years, I think two things become clear. He has wanted to have a state of law in the Soviet Union, a state based on a constitution with some degree of regularity, predictability, legality, because he was deeply impressed by the criminality of Stalinism and the damage it did to the Soviet Union. And he also wanted to have economic renewal because he became aware of the degree to which the Soviet Union had fallen behind the United States.

And he thought he could move towards both a state of law and economic renewal by a combination of political and economic reforms. The political reforms were to revitalize political life. Glasnost introduced pluralism, opened up the system to more discourse.

And he did that, and he has been remarkably successful in that respect and deserves credit and praise and historical recognition.

But in the process, he then discovered that the underlying political problem that is yet to be faced is the national problem. And he was shocked by the discovery. And the more the system became open, the more intensely the national conflicts have surfaced.

And the second problem he discovered was that, in fact, he cannot reform the economy piecemeal, as he is trying to do. He did not have, it seems to me, a rational sequence for his economic reforms.

Deng Xiaoping in China started with a massive reform of the agricultural system, then moved on to other layers. Gorbachev was not as consistent, nor as strategically structured.

Marshall Goldman, who will be testifying shortly, knows much more about this than I. But I have the distinct impression that his economic reform was not thought through, and increasingly became gridlocked and stalemated.

I see some analogies to his economic reform program and, particularly, its peaceful aspects to a hypothetical situation of a country, say, like Sweden, which 25 years ago decided to change from left-hand side driving to right-hand side driving.

And Gorbachev's reforms make me think of an arrangement whereby you would decide that first street buses would ride on the right-hand side, maybe three weeks later trucks would move over to the right-hand side, and then a few months later passenger cars would move over to the right-hand side. You'd get a gridlock. And that is what has happened to many of his economic reforms.

He also came to recognize ultimately, late last year, that if he pushes economic reform to its ultimate logical conclusion, and truly decentralizes the Shatalin Plan, you have to dismantle central political control as well.

And, hence, national aspirations will have an economic reality to them, an economic value to them. Economic decentralization will

reinforce political decentralization and promote the dispersal of the Soviet Union. And he's not prepared to do that. And he's been frank on this.

Let me draw your attention to a speech which I think is perhaps the most revealing of all the speeches he has made—at least I find it so—a speech he delivered at the end of November to a group of Soviet intellectuals, which he started by saying that "I have a prepared text, but I'm throwing it away. I want to tell you what I think."

And he really engages in what the French call "cri de coeur," a cry of the heart, a personal confession. He talked about his disillusionment, how he concluded, together with Shevardnadze in the course of private walks, that the system is completely rotten and had to be reformed.

But he says there are two ditches, two last ditches, which he will defend to the end, and which must never be abandoned. He compares them to the battles of Leningrad and Moscow.

And he says these two last ditches are ultimately socialism, particularly in the area of property, and particularly land, specifically land; and, secondly, a multinational state, controlled from the center.

He says it's narrow genes. It's about our history. We Russians have these narrow genes. He is not prepared to accept the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

And I think these two last ditches that he is prepared to defend have surfaced now as central problems, the economic crisis, the national crisis, while the political democratization has moved political aspirations in the country far beyond what he considers tolerable.

And you have, therefore, dissolution and polarization. Gorbachev increasingly, looks now like a historical anachronism.

And forces of the past, particularly the key solutions of power, the KGB, the army, the remnants of the Party apparatus, would like to preserve a centralized state, some degree of state control over the economy, and a stubborn organization.

And the middle has eroded. And hence, in that context, we have, in effect, an ambivalent, ambiguous, indecisive drift towards reaction. I don't expect the Soviet Union to become totalitarian, but I do think a kind of reactionary authoritarianism is taking over.

Let me, Mr. Chairman, conclude by sharing with you some of the implications and policy conclusions I draw from this. The first is that we cannot any longer put all of our eggs in one basket. We cannot view the totality of our relationship with the Soviet Union in terms of our relationship with Gorbachev. He deserves our respect. He deserves credit historically.

We ought to deal with him on those issues in which we ought to deal with him, if we can: strategic arms control, external issues. But I think, at the same time, we have to recognize that he is now willy-nilly participating in some efforts to restore authoritarianism and engage in repression.

And I regret, for example, that the President did not bring himself to say that he's postponing the summit, in part at least, because of the repression that Gorbachev either tolerated or undertook in regards to the Baltic Republics.

I'm not sure whether he's fully in control. To some extent, there are forces that he probably cannot fully control. But that's, yet, another reason, then, for not dealing with him in terms of the totality of our relationship.

If he's doing what has been happening, if he's responsible for the repression, that's a partial reason for not dealing with him in total. And if he's not in control, that's another reason for not dealing him in total. We have to operate simultaneously on different levels.

Second, therefore, I think we have to encourage particularly the democratic forces in Russia itself. I thought it was impressive that 300,000 people turned out in Moscow to protest the repression of the Baltic Republics.

I thought Yeltsin gave a remarkably courageous performance with his speech. We have to deal with these people. We have to engage in gestures designed to show support for Yeltsin, to elevate him in terms of his international status because, ultimately, it is the Russian people who will be making the decisive choice between democracy or empire, between prosperity or poverty. And we have to support the democratic forces in Russia.

Third, we ought to relate ourselves to the democratic governments in some of the Soviet Republics. The remarkable fact is that today in several Soviet Republics there are democratic governments in power, not Communist: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldavia, Georgia, Armenia, perhaps Azerbaijan, and I may have missed some.

We have to, to the extent that we can, relate to these Governments in order to give them authenticity, to enhance their legitimacy, to reinforce their international status.

Fourth, we ought to support the democratic movements elsewhere. And here I have, particularly, two in mind: the RUKH movement in the Ukraine, which aspires to be the Sajudis or the Solidarity movement of the Ukraine and deserves our encouragement and support; and some of the Soviet trade unions, particularly the miners, the oil workers, and the railroad workers, because they are developing a sense of joint solidarity and they are potentially very important forces in political change.

Fifth, we ought to promote as many legislative visits as we can with such institutional organs. And I was very happy to hear you say, Mr. Chairman, that your group is planning to go.

It is exactly the right thing to do. It introduces world public opinion into the Soviet Union and gives moral and political support to those who are engaged in the struggle.

Sixth, I think we ought to send observers, perhaps staffers of your own Commission, to watch the referendum in Lithuania, to observe it, to see if there's any interference with it. That will enhance its international significance.

Seventh, to the extent we can, we ought to channel and distribute philanthropic assistance in the Soviet Union through any of the aforementioned bodies, republican governments, trade unions, democratic movements, democratic city governments, because we enhance and strengthen the legitimacy of democratic institutions in the Soviet Union.

Eighth, we have got to, in my judgment, register our concern in international bodies regarding repression when it occurs, Lithuania

or Latvia, tomorrow maybe in Estonia or Georgia and elsewhere. We cannot ignore this issue in terms of the international bodies that have a legitimate reason to be concerned about them.

And, last, we have to in some fashion formalize, to the extent that we can, our relations with them, perhaps short of diplomatic relations in a form of recognition, because facts do not make that possible, and we have to also maintain relations with the Soviet Union on the formal level and try to negotiate with them, when appropriate. And we do not wish to reduce this issue to one of total antagonism with the government in power.

Nonetheless, we do have some precedents for indirect forms of recognition. And I wonder whether it would not be worthwhile for this Commission to explore the legalities and intricacies and potential complexities of doing with some of these national republics what we have very successfully done over the last decade with Taiwan.

We have in Taiwan an American institute, which is staffed allegedly by private Americans, but which, nonetheless, accounts for the maintenance of the relationship. Taiwan has a body in this country and also has the equivalent of consulates around the country without fighting and conflict.

I think there is a useful precedent here to explore which would permit us to engage in something which would be short of traditional diplomatic relationships and, yet, will be a positive and constructive recognition of this new reality in the Soviet Union.

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, that we're dealing here with a long historic process. The purpose of what I am saying is not to antagonize the American-Soviet relationship, but to use that relationship to encourage constructive and positive change in the Soviet Union towards genuine pluralism and democracy.

Ultimately, it is in the interest of all the peoples of the Soviet Union, the Russians foremost, that the Soviet Union be transformed into something very different based on the principle of pluralism and democracy. And that means freedom of choice.

Mr. Gorbachev put it better than I can, and I would like to end by quoting him from his speech to the United Nations only three years ago. "Freedom of choice is an absolute principle which should allow no exception. Freedom of choice is an absolute principle which should allow no exception." I think that applies very much to the dilemma that we're facing in the Soviet Union.

Thank you.

Chairman HOYER. Doctor, on behalf of all of the commissioners, I want to thank you for your testimony. I think this is poignant and helpful, particularly in terms of your eight points or nine points, in reference to what we can do.

You will be pleased to note that we are, in fact, sending staff members to Latvia and to the other elections. And, in fact, we have just issued a report on some of the elections that have already gone on in the Soviet Union to which you referred.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I have it right here, yes, the report.

Chairman HOYER. Good. Excellent. I'm not going to ask any questions. I took my time at the beginning. And I will turn to Senator DeConcini.

Co-Chairman DECONCINI. Mr. Chairman, thank you, Dr. Brzezinski. And I'm going to limit my questions because I know your time is strained. And I have many of them that I would like to pursue.

You talk about the two last ditches which Gorbachev will not give up: socialism, I believe, and the other one was multinationalism or the——

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Central state.

Co-Chairman DECONCINI. Central state and the union.

And, based on that, let me turn your attention to the economics. What does he do to maintain socialism and, particularly, to deal with property?

Some Soviet Communist Party officials are talking about, I have read, at least—and I have talked to one or two—a South Korea, Spain, or Chile as possible models for the USSR and since they developed market economies under an authoritarian political rule that we kind of wink at from the standpoint of being democracy, but we know better, and, yet, economically it seems to work.

What do you think of that kind of a mode or is that a possibility for Gorbachev and his advisers to turn to?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. If the Soviet Union was a nationally cohesive state, one could make a plausible case that something along these lines might be workable.

But there are at least two good reasons why I don't think it is workable in the actual conditions of the Soviet Union. First is that it is, in fact, a multinational state. And a free market would also enhance political dispersal of authority.

And the free market would work unevenly in the Soviet Union because of cultural differences. I think it's much more likely to be successful in the Baltic Republics, to some parts of the Caucasus in Central Asia than in Russia. And, therefore, it wouldn't have a unifying, but it would have a dispersing effect.

Secondly, the level of political activism in the Soviet Union today is much higher than it was, let's say, in Korea in the 1950's and 1960's. One of the lasting and important contributions of Gorbachev was to awaken political life and to make it a reality.

And it's particularly intense there where it is reinforced by nationalism. And, hence, an authoritarian, repressive regime would have to be based on the sole institutions that are capable of enforcing it, which are the army and the police.

And the only legitimacy justifying such repression would have to be Great Russian nationalism because the Communist ideology no longer has credibility.

And that, of course, would intensify nationalist factions and nationalist opposition. So I think it's a prescription for brutality as well as failure.

Co-Chairman DECONCINI. And let me ask you just a little follow-up question on that. Given that answer—and it's certainly a good one—what does he do economically?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, you'll have Mr. Goldman to speak on this——

Co-Chairman DECONCINI. Yes, I know, but I——

Dr. BRZEZINSKI [continuing]. And I'm sure that he knows much more about this than I do.

Co-Chairman DECONCINI. I know, but how do you——

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. My feeling is that he's not going to do very well, that he doesn't have any remedy short of the one that he's not prepared to accept, namely some, perhaps more ambitious form of the 500-day Shatalin proposal, which, however, entails the necessity of accepting both economic and political decentralization——

Co-Chairman DECONCINI. And he's not willing to do that.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI [continuing]. With the logical conclusion down the pike.

Co-Chairman DECONCINI. And that's an avenue——

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. He's not going to do it.

Co-Chairman DECONCINI [continuing]. That he won't take.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes.

Co-Chairman DECONCINI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Doctor.

Chairman HOYER. Mr. Ritter?

I would also like to welcome Senator D'Amato, the ranking Republican on the Senate side, Senator Heinz, and, of course, Dick Schifter, our Assistant Secretary of State for humanitarian concerns.

Mr. Ritter?

Congressman RITTER. Dr. Brzezinski, I think you covered part of my question, and that is: How far should we go in establishing ties with the republican leadership? I like to use that word.

Chairman HOYER. You can use it. The record said they will allow it, in fact.

Congressman RITTER. Small "r," by the way.

How far can we go or should we go? Should our administration be working on a Taiwan proposal at this time before it's too late, Taiwan-style arrangement?

Should we be moving now? Should we be discussing it? Should we be putting a commission together? What is your sense of the timing of this?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, as I have suggested in my opening remarks, I think this is one variant we ought to take a hard look at. I think there is something there to perhaps be emulated. We ought to also look at some of the agreements recently concluded between the Ukraine; R.S.F.S.R.; Lithuania, respectively; and Poland, where they talk about state to state relations.

And now they're having similar declarations reached between these republics of the still existing Soviet Union and Hungary. So that there is movement in the direction of some kind of formal ties between these republics and states outside, states that have some sympathy with the national aspirations.

I would think that some variant of these arrangements, perhaps along the lines of the institute-type relationship, is something that we ought to seriously consider.

There's no reason in my mind why there couldn't be some "private" American agency or institute operating in Vilnius or in Riga. There are many Americans of Lithuanian origin in this country, and that would justify having some form of a presence because of ethnic, cultural, social, but also economic and political ties.

I think we ought to explore these opportunities, take a look at these options, and see which one is the most feasible.

Congressman RITTER. Just one last brief question. We have heard the reports of the various intelligence reports, which are not confirmed, about Soviet assistance to the Iraqis. Do you put much credence to this or do you have any idea?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I don't. I have no independent judgment, but if the internal repression were to lean in the direction of some change in Soviet foreign policy, it is conceivable that things could move in that direction.

The only thing that I can draw your attention to that I personally am familiar with is a rather striking change in the tonality of Soviet press reporting on the war.

In the first few days of the war, maybe the first week of the war, it was, on the whole, almost uniformly sympathetic to what might be described as the American or coalition perspective on the issue.

Lately it has taken a distinctly pro-Iraqi character. It is much more sympathetic in its reporting of the war to the Iraqi side.

Congressman RITTER. Mr. Chairman, in the hope that we can make it short, I will go back. Thank you.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you.

Senator Fowler?

Senator FOWLER. Dr. Brzezinski, let me switch tracks for a second and pursue Mr. Ritter's line of questioning. I know you won't mind.

There were those—I don't think you were one of them, but there were those who described the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as arising out of the fact that the government simply could not tolerate an Islamic fundamentalist regime in Afghanistan with those 30 million Uzbeks, or however many there are, on the Afghanistan border.

How is even the beginnings of a solution to the nationalities problem that you have described complicated, in your opinion, by the war?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Which war?

Senator FOWLER. The middle eastern war.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. The third one. I don't know as of now what impact it is having on the attitudes of the Soviet Muslims. We do know that the very successful resistance of the Afghan Mujaheddin had a truly energizing impact on their religious and national sense of identity.

Whether the war in the Persian Gulf will have some similar effect may depend on how long it endures, the extent to which the Iraqi people, and maybe even Saddam Hussein personally, come to be viewed as martyrs, in which case it might even further intensify their sense of religious national fervor.

In any case, I think you are dealing with about 50 million Muslims in the Soviet Union who are increasingly conscious of their religious and national distinctiveness and they are increasingly resentful of Russian domination.

And this is a very difficult problem for many Russians because the Russians have become accustomed to thinking of Soviet Central Asia as part of the extension of their traditional sphere of influence.

In Kazakhstan, there are a great many Russian settlers. It will be very difficult for the Russians to disengage in some parts of Central Asia, at least.

Senator FOWLER. Mr. Chairman, for my second and last question in the interest of time, again, going a little further afield, but staying on the war, Dr. Brzezinski, I ask you to pretend that you're back at the Pell hearings or the other hearings to sort of follow up.

In your opinion, what goals remain for Saddam Hussein? If you would agree that he stood up to the American deadline, once he did that, I assume he had to draw American blood, some Israeli blood, and some Arab blood. Assume he had done all that.

Last week he invaded Saudi Arabia. So he's got bragging rights to invading a country and even holding a town for a few hours, which I'm sure he can propagandize as a major event.

What's left that he would have to achieve to remain a legitimate Arab hero that he has not accomplished as of today?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I think fundamentally to survive as long as he has survived in the context of the ongoing hostilities, the more he is going to look like an Arab leader. He stood up to an American-led coalition, to the only super power in the world, and neither fled nor was crushed.

And I think Arabs have a sense of considerable historical embarrassment over what has happened in the course of the last several decades in terms of hostilities. And, yet, in the field they have been defeated relatively promptly.

The only one whom they think did reasonably well was Saddam. And even there the picture was mixed. If Saddam Hussein can endure against this powerful coalition, it will go a long way in reviving Arab self-esteem.

And this, of course, will strengthen his political appeal, even if in the field he is defeated and eventually forced out of Kuwait.

Senator FOWLER. What do you mean by "survive"?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I mean survive personally; and, secondly, politically, so that he will retain a political base.

Senator FOWLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you, Senator.

Congressman Markey left. Senator Wirth, I believe you are next.

Senator WIRTH. I don't know if you have had any questions about the seriousness of the resurgence of the military. Have you? I'm sorry. I missed a couple of the question periods and I didn't hear you address that.

Might you talk a little bit about the resurgence, of the military and perhaps other forces on the right? And does that suggest that as the United States was addressing Gorbachev over the last 3 years, we may have missed a significant opportunity to be strengthening the more democratic forces on the left?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, I'm not sure that we have missed any major opportunities, though I think we have been perhaps somewhat excessively passive in nurturing the democratic forces on the left. We did much more along those lines in terms of Eastern Europe with rather positive results.

But insofar as the Soviet army is concerned—and General Odom will be talking about this more and he knows much more about it than I do—I think it is a fact that with the fragmentation of the

state authority, with the emergence of independent, somewhat independent, republican governments and noncommunist governments, with the demoralization, organizationally and ideologically, of the Communist Party, there are only two institutions left in the Soviet Union that so to speak can act in order to preserve the empire: the army and the secret police.

And they are imbued with an ethic, which makes them think of the empire almost in personal terms, they identify with it.

And there is now an increasing symbiotic relationship between the secret police and the army. After all, the deputy head of the police is now the senior army general, a very unusual appointment, General Gromov, a rather surprisingly popular figure in terms of mass media and mass appeal in the Soviet Union, particularly in Russia. Under his stewardship, three army divisions have been shifted over to the police.

So the role of the army in the preservation of the internal empire I think is becoming quite significant. I think the army is rather bitter against Gorbachev, and particularly Shevardnadze, for having presided over the essential dissolution of the external empire and they are determined not to permit the dissolution of the internal empire, by which I mean, of course, the Soviet Union itself.

Senator WIRTH. Mr. Chairman, I know that Dr. Brzezinski has to leave.

I thank you, again, for being here so late as it is 3 o'clock. Thank you.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you.

Senator Heinz?

Senator HEINZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm delighted that you're here again, and thank you for continuing to provide us wonderful, valuable insights. Two questions. One, you talked about how it would be highly desirable for the United States to support the republics, people like Yeltsin, and Yeltsin quite specifically.

And you mentioned, as I heard your answer to Don Ritter's question, that it would be a good idea to attempt to establish some kind of official presence in each of the Baltic States.

How much further and in what ways should the United States move to further demonstrate its support, not just rhetorically, but concretely, for what you might call the democrats in the republics?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, there are negative and positive aspects of that. On the negative side, I would say we shouldn't really hesitate.

We shouldn't be timid in stating openly that the continuing improvement in the American-Soviet relationship and, particularly, a close personal tie between the American and Soviet Presidents is going to be adversely affected by what happens.

For example, I think it really was excessive timidity that the postponement of the summit was deliberately de-linked, de-linked, from the repression in the Baltic Republics.

I think it should have been linked. And if we couldn't say it in a formal statement, we could have had briefings at the White House, which would still link it on background. But the White House and others de-link it. That I think is the wrong signal.

On the positive side, I think that there are many things we can do, for example, to enhance the status of the democratic noncommunist leaderships. Take Yeltsin. I think he has been remarkably courageous in his public pronouncements, particularly on the question of violence.

There are opportunities to give him awards. There are opportunities to honor him. There are opportunities to invite him. The next time he comes, hopefully he will not be sneaked into the White House through the basement door and treated to a quasi-visit.

There are ways of symbolically enhancing the status in the world of those who are struggling for democracy. That helps them.

Senator HEINZ. Do you believe it's possible to administer, say, direct food aid to the republics?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes, because in a number of cities, in fact, it is the democratic governments that increasingly are capable of providing adequate, effective distribution.

And they would like us to do it. And if they're inhibited from doing it, then we see, then the Soviet people see, that the Soviet Government has not permitted, say, a democratically elected government in Moscow to receive food. Then we see.

Then I think we are making the cause of democracy more closely identified with survival and well being.

Senator HEINZ. Thank you.

My last question is this: You have made a point of saying that the only two institutions left are the army and the secret police, around which any ordering of forces might coalesce. I assume, therefore, what you are saying is that the Communist Party is, in fact, dead and buried, cannot be brought back, and can no longer be, under any imaginable circumstances, a future organizing political principle.

Do I read more into your statement?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, maybe you're reading a touch more into it, but basically, I think you are expressing what I was trying to say.

My point was that it is demoralized, organizationally, and ideologically. That is to say in some places, in some places it is taken over even by nationalistic democratic movements.

The majority of Communists in Lithuania identify themselves with Lithuania, the same as it is with some of the other republics. Beyond that, it is demoralized because there is a sense, a pervasive sense, that the last 70 years have been a failure.

There is an increasing sense among thoughtful people in Russia that Russia has been the victim of an incredible tragedy, that the Communist experience, the 70 years under Communist rule, are the equivalent of a black hole in Russian history, a tragedy which is simultaneously political, economic, human, social, ecological. And this is not exaggeration.

Now, the Party is identified with that. And the prescriptions of the Party are discredited. Last but not least, we live in an age of mass communications. People in the Soviet Union now know what it is that they must do.

When I first as a young graduate student started going to the Soviet Union, I used to meet Party officials and young people and others. And all of them were convinced that life in the Soviet Union was better than anywhere else. They really believed that.

Today there is pervasive awareness that life in the Soviet Union is a needless, needless misery inflicted upon the Soviet people by the Communist leadership.

Senator HEINZ. Thank you.

Chairman HOYER. I will not overlook Senator Wallop again. I overlooked him for an opening statement because he's sitting right next to me and I assumed that I would go down the road. And now I've overlooked him to ask questions. I apologize.

Senator Wallop?

Senator WALLOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be very brief.

Dr. Brzezinski, let me begin with a little observation. You, in particular, are so meticulous in your use of words and know that in a democracy, words have meaning.

I'll be damned if I can understand how the right is considered a purer form of communism and the left a purer form of capitalism.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, you know, "right" and "left" are meaningless terms in the end.

Senator WALLOP. They're not so meaningless when they're used.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. In the end, it's like a circle, it seems to me. And so you don't know what's left and right.

Senator WALLOP. Thank you. That at least clarifies it some.

Two quick things. You mentioned that we ought to indulge in a channelization of philanthropic efforts toward organizations and unions, et cetera.

What do we do about private U.S. institutions and businesses that wish to conduct their business in the Soviet Union further? There really is yet no rule of law with respect to the rights of the individual, only with respect to the rights of the state.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, I would avoid financing American business enterprises in the Soviet Union from the public treasury. But if any private American enterprise wishes to do business in the Soviet Union, let it be.

In some cases, it may turn out well. My own prediction would be that in most cases, it will turn out badly. But the U.S. Government has no institutionalized obligation to protect private business from their own foolishness.

Senator WALLOP. And, lastly, do we contemplate dealing with Yeltsin and the Russian Republic as we do with Lithuania—in sort of the Taiwan institute model?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes, it is possible if he wants it, if we can do it.

Senator WALLOP. Well, I detected a little earlier, at least I thought I did in your testimony, that the Russian Republic would be a risk factor.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, if I conveyed this, it wasn't my intention. I think there is a special problem in Russia in the sense that Russians are torn, understandably so. Some attach intrinsic importance to the preservation of this larger entity.

Some realize the historical cost of it. And there is this duality of feeling and attitude. And Yeltsin stands, I believe, for the more progressive, forward-looking elements, who realize that the empire of the past is a burden for the future.

And you have to realize that the word "Russia" has a kind of dual meaning for the Russians. It is as if there was a single word

for the two words that are used in the context of the U.K.: "England" and "Britain."

England means a specific part of Great Britain. Great Britain means the larger entity. Russia has a dual meaning. It has simultaneously the meaning of England and of Britain.

And I think when Gorbachev speaks, when he speaks from the heart, he uses it in this larger sense. And it's very hard to break with something that you feel is organically cast as part of your past.

So it's a very difficult choice Russians face. And, yet, they have to make it because if they don't, they're going to be condemned to decades and decades of struggle to preserve an empire which no longer is legitimate against peoples who are determined to achieve self-determination, peoples who in many cases will be prepared to compromise with them. But they have to be given the opportunity of free choice first.

Senator WALLOP. Thank you.

Chairman HOYER. Senator D'Amato, the former chairman and ranking member of the Commission?

Senator D'AMATO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First let me commend you for these hearings. We certainly appreciate the presence of Dr. Brzezinski and his incredible and outstanding and precise testimony and his responsiveness to the answers. It is all appreciated very much, especially your thoughtfulness in this area.

Doctor, I'd like to make one observation. I couldn't agree with you more as it relates to our treatment of Boris Yeltsin. Instead of sneaking him in, as you say, in the back door or the basement, it seems to me that our country should be much more open with him in our dealings, giving him a kind of recognition instead of attempting to paint him as a cad.

I'm not going to go into some of the kinds of pejoratives that our State Department has engaged in over periods of time. Whether it's by deliberately failing to correct the propaganda that has been put out against Boris Yeltsin in the past, by acquiescence they feed the disinformation program that has been brought against him.

So I think they have got to not only put a stop to that, but I think they probably have. I think we have to be more affirmative in attempting to work with him and deal with him and do the kinds of things that relate to diplomatic undertakings.

And, ultimately, it will give, I think, to those who seek democracy, strength, and resolve. What are they to think? Are they going to stand up if we run away?

That leads me to the one question. You mentioned that the United States should strengthen diplomatic relations, although something less than according them full diplomatic relations, to, let's say, the Baltics.

In light of further developments, such as Iceland's full recognition of Lithuania, let me pose: What problems do you see? Why shouldn't the United States join in recognizing the Baltic States? I understand that the Scandinavian countries are also contemplating formal diplomatic recognition of at least Lithuania.

Why shouldn't the United States give that full diplomatic recognition to Lithuania?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, I can give you a formal response to it.

Senator D'AMATO. No. I would like you——

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Well, I will do both, formal and then a kind of political. The formal one is that we do not recognize the in corporation of these republics into the Soviet Union and we, therefore, do recognize their juridical claim to independence. And that is our formal position. That's why we have their legations here, as we are and we should. We should be proud of that.

But from a de facto point of view, Lithuania is not yet a fully sovereign state. It does not have control fully over its territory, over its armed forces. It doesn't have formal armed forces. It is subject to effective Soviet control.

Therefore, to treat it as if it was a de facto independent state would simply be a denial of reality. It would be merely a statement of our aspiration, but not a statement regarding the actual situation.

Beyond that, from a political point of view, we do have to balance our sympathy and our commitment to their aspirations, with the need to maintain a relationship with the Soviet Union.

After all, we do have a number of issues that we will negotiate with the Soviet Union. It is a partner of ours, an adversary at the same time, on a number of political issues.

I don't think we can put on the knife's edge the totality of our relationship with the Soviet Union over the question of diplomatic recognition of Lithuania if, particularly, we are not physically able to translate that recognition into something that is real.

We cannot send ambassadors, set up an embassy in Vilnius, but we could take a giant step in that direction, I think, by creating something like the institute in Taipei in Vilnius.

Senator D'AMATO. And would you be aggressive in pushing that kind of——

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I think we should move in that direction.

Senator D'AMATO. Doctor, once again, I thank you for your testimony and for your thoughtfulness, too. It was precise. I think you have given in a short period of time the realities of this situation, recognizing the moral dilemmas that are posed as well, and I am deeply appreciative of your time and your testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you.

Secretary Schifter, would you like to——

Assistant Secretary SCHIFTER. I have only one question. That is, do you believe that the Soviet military leadership is monolithic, supporting a single point of view?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. No. I don't think it is monolithic, but I'm not sure that we know a great deal about different factional centers within it. We do have some sense of a gap that is opening up between the much younger officers and the senior officers.

Presumably the younger officers have a greater degree of sympathy for or identification with social aspirations, but that is balanced by an enormous amount of frustration over the economic and social conditions. And resentments connected with that are channeled against Gorbachev.

Within the top echelons, I suspect the preponderant inclination is a very jaundiced view of the external arrangements reached by

Gorbachev and Shevardnadze regarding Eastern Europe, including the Soviet troop withdrawals.

And I think there is probably a great deal of frustration over what they perceive to be Gorbachev's indecisiveness in dealing with the national aspirations of the Baltics and others.

And a great many of the military would like to get it over and done with by crushing the Baltics and doing to them what was done to the Hungarians.

Chairman HOYER. Doctor, again thank you. All of the members have stated that your testimony was excellent, concise, and I think your proposals for U.S. action were right on point.

And I might say, on behalf of Senator DeConcini and myself, we see this Commission as having a real charge, under the law morally and politically, to pursue those objectives. And we thank you for your testimony.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and may God be with you.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you very much.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Good luck. Thank you.

Chairman HOYER. I'm going to leave, not because Dr. Marshall Goldman is going to testify, but I have to vote. And I'll be right back. Senator DeConcini will chair.

Co-Chairman DECONCINI [presiding]. Mr. Goldman, if you would please come forward? I think your background is so well-known, but, just for the record, you are the Kathryn W. Davis Professor of Soviet Economics at Wellesley and the Associate Director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard.

You are, indeed, recognized as an expert, an authority on the economy, environmental concerns, and foreign relations with the Soviet Union. You have traveled there many, many times.

You've published and lectured and written, and I understand you are now in the process of a current book entitled "What Went Wrong With Perestroika?"

So we appreciate you being here with us today. You may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF PROF. MARSHALL L. GOLDMAN, KATHRYN W. DAVIS PROFESSOR OF SOVIET ECONOMICS, WELLESLEY COLLEGE; ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, RUSSIAN RESEARCH CENTER, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Professor GOLDMAN. I thank you very much, Senator. I have a formal statement which I'll submit. I prefer not to read it, but to summarize it, if I can.

Co-Chairman DECONCINI. That's quite fine. Thank you.

Professor GOLDMAN. I also want to say that I have a great deal of respect for this Commission because I think you have been speaking out over the years on the issues, when they were much more complicated, not to say that they're simple now. You certainly deserve a lot of credit for that.

It's also a pleasure for me to be here because 4 years ago this coming March, I was here before this same Commission and testified then that I thought that we would be lucky if Gorbachev were the general secretary 4 years from then, which would be March

1991. That got me into a lot of difficulty, and not the least with my wife, who thought I should have said 10 years so people would have forgotten.

But as I began to reflect on that, I came to ask myself what led me to make that kind of prediction. Even if Gorbachev should last one more month, it seems to me certainly a very different Gorbachev than the one that we grew to applaud and cherish just a few months ago.

What went wrong? And what is happening now? And what are the implications for the future? I would like to try to address some of those issues.

You have heard a little bit today from Mr. Brzezinski about Gorbachev's background. He certainly is a mixed person. One of the things that we forget is that when he first took over in March 1985, he was not the kind of man that we came to see. He, indeed, was not born a democrat and he, indeed, was not in favor of market reform.

He warned intellectuals at that time that if they spoke up too much, they would cause problems for the Soviet Union. He did not want them to drag up too many issues from the past. He did not talk then about opening up blank pages. He was much more concerned about keeping them empty. And private property, as you have heard, was a no-no.

But, lest we become victims of revisionism and say, "Well, Gorbachev never was interested in some of those things," I think we also have to recognize that he was very much of a pragmatist. Often he would hesitate. Often he would resist. Often he would say "No," at least at first.

But we shouldn't forget that glasnost and perestroika really came from him and were his ideas. At the same time, Gorbachev has given us some very interesting insights into the origins of perestroika and glasnost.

That speech that Dr. Brzezinski referred to in November 1990 is a very interesting one. He described how he took a walk along the beach in Georgia with Shevardnadze in December 1984, before Gorbachev came into power.

Shevardnadze, as you have heard, said to him "Everything has gone rotten. The system hasn't worked." But the question is: what should the solution be?

Gorbachev and Shevardnadze had this discussion. And they came up, Gorbachev said, with the concepts of "perestroika, more democracy, and more glasnost, and more humanity. On the whole, everything must develop so that the person in this society should feel like a human being."

It's a remarkable statement in the context of the time. He wanted people to feel like human beings. He wanted a very simple formula. The devil was in the doing. It's an easy thing to say, but they had trouble trying to implement it, particularly in a very short period of time. Perhaps its asking too much.

We sometimes forget that it took us a century or two to achieve the economic and democratic pluralism that we have now. But in the case of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev has not had yet quite 6 years.

To suddenly open up this society with 100 or more different ethnic groups, with everybody demanding everything at once is inevitably going to create problems, particularly when you don't have a road map, particularly when you find yourself reinventing political pluralism.

In that environment, Gorbachev is bringing to his people the market, which will mean some unemployment. It may also mean inequality in income, and it also may mean inflation.

If the economy falters as it has, that's certain to set off protest and concern. As you combine, then, perestroika, the economic reforms, with glasnost, and also give people the right to vote, you know you're going to have trouble.

To me it is very interesting to contrast what Gorbachev has been trying to do now with an earlier period under Khrushchev. In 1957 Khrushchev talked about something he called the sovnarkhozy. These were regional economic groups.

And he gave to the different republics a considerable amount of economic authority. And this was a high point for them, one of their best times.

But there was very little talk then of nationalism, of independence. And the reason for that is that if you did make such demands, you would be arrested or sent to a psychiatric hospital.

Then came the Gorbachev era. And what does Gorbachev do? Well, first of all, he began reducing Party discipline. He began to talk about these same things. And in that process, he found himself treading new territory without any solid answers.

There was a very interesting incident that Gorbachev described when he was concerned about too much independence in the Baltic States just about 2 years ago. And he called the then head of the Communist Party in Lithuania, Brazauskas, and said to him "Settle things down there. Make sure that this protest doesn't get out of hand."

Brazauskas' answer was very interesting. He said, "I can't do that." He said, "You're the one who set up these elections. If I want to hold on in my post, I have to be responsive to the people. That's the danger, in a sense, of democracy."

And so Gorbachev lost one of these control mechanisms (the Party) that he had. And the society then became permissive in the eyes of some. It was like the sorcerer's apprentice. Gorbachev had set in motion forces that he no longer could control.

Let me say something now about the current trend. Why is Gorbachev now turning to the direction that he's turning to. Whether it's right or left, let me just try to define them as anti-reform forces.

Gorbachev at the end of August had come to accept the 500-day plan for economic reform that we've come to call the Shatalin Plan. It was a very bold move. It was a comprehensive move. It was a move that perhaps should have been introduced in the first few months of Gorbachev's administration.

More important than coming to accept this plan, he also agreed that he would work out a compromise version of this plan with Yeltsin, thereby bringing the Russian Republic and the Soviet Union together.

Gorbachev should have resigned then. Unfortunately, he didn't. Because then he would have gone down in history without bloodying his record in Lithuania.

The trouble began right away. The trouble began in late July and in August, when the military and industrial complex in the Soviet Union became very frightened.

As one of Gorbachev's advisers said, the industry people, the army people, and "the red landowners," by which he means the directors of the different state and collective farms, began to see that if the Shatalin plan was implemented, it would mean the end of their power and their authority.

Among other things this would have involved a 10 percent reduction in the military budget, 20 percent reduction in the KGB budget, 75 percent reduction in foreign aid. It ultimately would have also broken up the farms. It would have led to a cutting of the subsidies for the factories. It would have meant the end of Gosplan. Most important, it would have meant turning over the powers to the republics and their taxes.

One of the things we have forgotten is that in September, there were all of these rumors of coups. Why were troops appearing in Red Square in the middle of the night with flak jackets? The official answer that they were going off to pick potatoes, didn't seem very sensible.

It was not a coup in the formal sense of the word, but it was a coup, nonetheless. It was a coup in which, basically, Gorbachev shifted directions.

I think Gorbachev found himself like a ship's captain in a hurricane. He went to the port side. That didn't seem to work. In this case, what he did was shift to the starboard side.

But what happened, of course, is that in the process, he brought enormous seasickness to the whole society because he abandoned the reforms. He abandoned Shatalin. He abandoned Yeltsin.

He may have heeded the warnings from the anti-reformers and taken two steps backwards. In effect he joined with those like the head of the KGB, who said in December that "You cannot trust the foreign community. They're shipping us contaminated grain" or "They're shipping us radioactive food. They're trying to restore bourgeois capitalism in our society."

And, of course, Shevardnadze found himself caught in this kind of situation. He, one of the original midwives at the birth of perestroika and glasnost, now found himself under enormous attack.

He was under attack from the KGB and from the army. Somebody asked the question before about the world of the army. The army is furious because they see they have lost all their gains from World War II.

Germany is reunited. Eastern Europe has thrown out communism. The Soviet Union has disarmed unilaterally as far as they see it or, certainly, disproportionately.

And now the Soviet Union finds itself supporting American war imperialism, oil imperialism in the Persian Gulf. Instead the Soviet Union should be supporting its traditional allies from the Third World, particularly Iraq.

And, finally, Gorbachev is told by the army officers in a meeting that he held with them on November 17 that he has 30 days "to impose order or face a vote of no confidence."

On December 1 he ordered the republics to shape up, to enforce mobilization for the draft because draft-dodging had reached as high as 85 percent in some of the republics. And then on January 7 he orders the paratroops into five or six different republics.

What does this mean for the republics and for the economy? This is made all the more serious by the fact that the economy is deteriorating. The poor economy exacerbates the pressures to secede.

Look at Western Europe. Countries are giving up sovereignty there, but that's because they think they will do better in a united Europe. In the Soviet Union they often think they will do better on their own.

In turn, the republics have decided to set off on their own, which leads to even more economic problems. As a consequence, nobody pays attention to the orders from the center. They are ignored. Gorbachev gives orders. They're ignored. He gives another order saying they should "pay attention to my orders." That's ignored. In the meantime, inflation is destroying the ruble so that the normal operation of the economy simply begins to break down.

And you get different reactions. Some want complete independence, as in the Baltics and Georgia. Others say they want some association, as in the case of Armenia and Central Asia. Some republics themselves are in turmoil.

Yeltsin says he wants more autonomy, but within the Russian republics are 10 to 15 different autonomous regions saying they want autonomy from Yeltsin. He then wants independence from Gorbachev.

And who owns the raw materials? Nobody seems to know. The cities want their own control. Some cities have introduced their own money. Some republics have introduced their own tariff controls.

In this kind of environment, it's like a massive divorce, where everybody's upset with everybody else. It's very difficult to see how you put this thing back together.

There's resentment over the empire. The republics resent the center. The center resents the periphery. It's the only empire I know where the center feels itself as abused as the periphery.

And the reforms have lost their focus. Money has no meaning. They introduce a monetary reform, without an accompanying price reform. So they solve nothing.

There are rumors today that within the next few days, all hard currency accounts will be frozen in exactly the same kind of way it was before with the monetary reform.

In the meantime, they sent in the KGB as the solution to the problems, to stop corruption. "If we can only send in the KGB, the corruption will stop." And the KGB is then being used not only to police and intimidate people, but also to go off after Gorbachev's enemies.

A man by the name of Artem Tarasov, who was one of Yeltsin's biggest supporters, and his aides are now being investigated for corruption. This is also one way to get at Yeltsin.

Let me end, then, with some examples of how the system has broken down. This summer I was at the Institute of Finance and I asked the Director, "Who's collecting the taxes now? Is it the City of Moscow which is collecting them, the republics, or the whole union, Yeltsin, or Gorbachev?" And he says, "I don't know."

They said to me that they really don't know who's collecting the taxes. How can you put together a budget? How can you balance the budget, which you must do when their budget deficit now represents 10 to 20 percent of the Soviet Union. We have almost no problem in comparison.

Then one other illustration, which I think brings all of these things together. There's a tractor factory in the City of Vladimir, not far from Moscow. They depend upon their tires from Armenia.

Last January, when Armenia and Azerbaijan went to war, Azerbaijan declared an embargo on all things coming in and out of Armenia. This meant the tractor factory in Vladimir couldn't have tires for its tractors. That has certain disadvantages.

In the process of sending those tractors to the Ukraine in the time of the richest harvest in Russian Soviet history, the Ukrainians found that these tractors were inoperable, of course. In addition to which those tractors with tires found that they couldn't have fuel because the Russians refused to send diesel fuel, which they were ordered to do, to the Ukrainian Republic because the Ukrainians refused to deliver grain to the Russians.

So here you had this situation: the richest harvest in the country's history, no bread on the shelves.

Alexis De Toqueville said the most dangerous time for a bad regime is when it seeks to remedy its problems. The trouble is Gorbachev has given a bad name to reform. The problem is the system is breaking down.

They used to ask in the Soviet Union "Could there be socialism in one country?" Now they're asking a very different question "Can the world come to an end in one country?" And the answer so far is we don't know.

Co-Chairman DECONCINI. Thank you, Mr. Goldman.

General Odom, if you could come up? And we'll take your statement now.

I do want to apologize for members leaving. The administration at the cabinet level is giving a briefing at 3:30 p.m. on the Gulf War, and that's where all of the members of the Senate have run off. And the House is having a vote.

I think General Odom is well-known. At least he is to this Senator. And the Lieutenant General is Director of National Security Studies for the Hudson Institute and an adjunct professor at Yale University.

From 1985 to 1988 General Odom served as the Director of the National Security Agency. From '81 to '85 he was Deputy Assistant and then Assistant Chief of Staff for intelligence. He served under the Carter administration. He was senior member of the National Security Council.

Having worked with the General on the Intelligence Committee, I know what a great resource he is. And we're very pleased to have him here. So before we get into questions for you, Mr. Goldman,

General Odom, would you like to summarize your statement? General, thank you.

TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. WILLIAM E. ODOM (RETIRED), ARMY LIEUTENANT GENERAL; DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, HUDSON INSTITUTE; ADJUNCT PROFESSOR, YALE UNIVERSITY

Lt. General ODOM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will summarize my statement, which I am submitting formally, but I won't read.

Co-Chairman DECONCINI. Thank you.

Lt. General ODOM. And I would like to repeat the points of the previous people who testified and the points made by the Commission, particularly at this juncture. I was very pleased to see you making an issue of this subject today because I think the timing of it is critical.

In discussing this hearing with your staff, I essentially was asked to answer three questions. Who is in charge? What is the state of the coercive forces? And the U.S. policy problems, what are they and what should we do about them?

Let me just make a few points on each, in no sense fully answer them because I think a lot of the answers have already been pretty well presented today. I would like to reemphasize and simplify the structure, the logic of perestroika and Gorbachev's reform.

I think it's fairly clear from Dr. Brzezinski's testimony and Professor Goldman's testimony that if one decentralizes the control over power, not surprisingly, one decentralizes with it considerable power.

And in the Soviet Union, given the deeply repressed forces of national self-determination, the expression, political expression, that appeared was bound to be self-determination and secession from the Soviet Union.

Therefore, I was puzzled when Gorbachev started down this path because it's fairly apparent where it leads. It would lead to the breakup of the Soviet Union if it succeeded as reform. If he succeeded in avoiding the dissolution of the union, he was sure to fail at reform.

So he essentially put his foot in two boats, reform and empire, and tried to sail them on the same course. They were bound to diverge. And we have seen that happen, particularly in the year 1990.

Now, to me the great factor of change in Soviet politics really became obvious last summer. That the Baltics would try to secede is hardly surprising, or that Georgians, the Ukrainians and others would get upset is hardly surprising. But it is a new phenomenon for the Russians to try to secede from Russia.

They refused to make that choice in 1917 and 1918. The Russian Constitutional Democrats were against self-determination. Now we have some Russian rebels who are talking about Russian secession, Russian self-determination.

When Yeltsin became head of the Russian Republic, a short time later he walked out of the Communist Party Congress, saying "I will no longer be a member." In doing that in a very dramatic fash-

ion, and then affiliating himself with the Russian Church, he was appealing to a Russian separatism we had not seen before.

I think that since last summer, the structure of Soviet politics has been "Saint Boris of Holy Russian versus Comrade Gorbachev of the Soviet Union." And the battle lines are drawn.

Earlier I heard one of the question-askers talk about whether the forces were conservative or liberal, right or left. I think the media has grossly misled us, and many of my academic colleagues have misled us, on the dynamics of the politics of the Soviet Union.

It really hasn't mattered whether you have a left intelligentsia, right intelligentsia, or little political parties in Moscow. None of them have any power because they don't have any property, and they don't have any regional base of support.

They get the television time. They make brilliant speeches from the tribune of the Supreme Soviet, but they are politically insignificant.

The real diffusion of political power has been from the center to the republics. And we're seeing that manifestation. We saw it reach, I think, a new, almost a breakthrough, threshold this past summer.

Now, can it be turned around? I think the answer to that is found in the state coercive forces. I would just mention it briefly, but I could go into much more detail.

Gorbachev's own military reform program set in motion a considerable decay in the Soviet military and a dynamic that has been devastating. It led to public debate on mandatory military conscription. And in turn it has fueled national separatism.

The KGB and the MVD have also experienced some of this diffusion of power to the republics. Some of the local republican KGB chiefs and MVD chiefs have not been all that enthusiastic about central control.

Now, a counter trend began in January 1990. We saw the Soviet Army used for the first time to arrest political leaders of a popular front. That was in Baku. Troops had been used earlier in Tbilisi, but they had not arrested political leaders.

On February 21, Red Army Day, we saw Gorbachev tilt toward the army by saying flattering things about it. We saw him promote Yazov to Marshal of the Soviet Union on the eve of May Day, after having said there would be no more Marshals in peacetime.

And then, at the Party Congress in June, we saw the Party Conservatives, plus the military Communists there, win most of the major points. We saw a great deal of effort to build up the forces in the MVD and the KGB.

The civilian critics of the military on military reform were, essentially, pushed aside, and the military was left in charge of its own reform.

By September or October, it was very clear we were heading for a backlash. The question is not whether it was a backlash. The question is: Who's going to win?

I would have said it was a close call last fall because that was when I began to see some of the organizational strengthening of the MVD. I began to think maybe the forces for repression had gained the upper hand.

Having seen the opening of the backlash in Lithuania and the resistance to it by the national republics, the reaction against it in Moscow by demonstrations, and particularly Yeltsin's position and the position of the Georgians and the Armenians, who said, "Our militias will fight you if you come and try to repress us," I've changed my mind. Let me get back to the betting window and replace my bets. I think there's a very real prospect that things will go the way of dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Now, this brings me to the issue of a military coup. I have always thought that the idea of a coup in the Soviet Union misperceived the whole structure of the Party-military relationship. There's no prospect of a military coup. The real issue is whether the center is going to keep the control of the military or whether Boris Yeltsin and some of the republics are going to take parts of it.

And, most interesting in that regard, last Friday or Thursday, one day last week, Yeltsin appointed Colonel General Konstantin Kobets, a Deputy Chief of the General Staff, as head of his Committee on State Defense and Security, the equivalent of a Minister of Defense, in the Russian Republic. That is a fascinating move.

He has been floating the idea of a separate Russian Army and KGB. There has been a lot of thought behind that before this idea was made public. So it's not an off-the-wall remark. He has long been courting the dissident lower-ranking officers in the military. What is bound to be critical to the future is the competition between Yeltsin and Gorbachev for control of the senior military.

Co-Chairman DECONCINI. For what?

Lt. General ODOM. Control of the military. The republics are developing their own militaries. And the big military, the Soviet military, is a prize to be sparred over between Gorbachev and Yeltsin.

Now, what does all of this mean for the future? I think it confronts us simply with the choice we have been talking about here earlier. Do we favor dissolution of the Soviet Union or at least secession of some of the states or do we favor maintaining its territorial integrity?

There are two arguments generally made against favorings its dissolution. One, which Professor Cohen of Princeton likes to make, is that we have to back Gorbachev so he can restore authority and proceed with liberal reform.

What reform? I think it's evident in the testimony here today that if he recentralizes his power, there's no prospect of reform. To help him do that is to ensure there will be no reform.

Therefore, I can only conclude that Professor Cohen is as confused about the prospects of reform in the Soviet Union as Gorbachev is. And I don't think we should take that as anything but a specious argument.

The second point, it might cause civil war. Indeed, it might, but the road to liberalism and democracy in Western Europe and the United States is paved by a lot of blood.

Furthermore, we already have civil war in the Soviet Union, a lot of it stimulated by the KGB among the ethnic minorities against the Georgians, against the Moldavians, against others.

So the choice isn't whether we're going to propagate violence by saying we support some secessionist movements. The question is,

you know, which way the violence is going to go, for or against self-determination. And I think the issue of violence is a bit off the mark the way it has been used against self-determination.

Now, the argument that an authoritarian system, like Chile, is essential for Soviet reform, as a number of Soviet writers are now saying, of all things, ironically citing also the Tawain experience after years of having condemned it, is interesting but premature.

I think that would be very appropriate in the future. A South Korean or Taiwan model would be very appropriate for the republics after they have seceded. Yes, it is indeed relevant, but it's not relevant to the Soviet Union. It's relevant to Russia and the Baltics as sovereign states.

Let me end my remarks by saying that, in addition to the—on the point of secession, I accept very much some of the policy points that Dr. Brzezinski made.

I would not go all the way to self-determination for every ethnic minority in the Soviet Union. I think that we don't want that principle here. We don't want it in Africa. We don't want it in a lot of other places.

It strikes me, though, that in the case of the Baltics and Moldavia, we have a clear and reasoned legal basis. The legal instrument for Soviet rule over them is the Nazi-Soviet pact. Even the Soviet Government has renounced that instrumentality.

What answer does Gorbachev have? What claim does he have to rule over them? In those cases it seems to me we're really obligated to take a fairly clear position.

Now, as far as being aggressive in our actions against the Soviet Union, I don't think it requires that. I think the kind of moderate negative and positive measures that were discussed earlier make a lot of sense.

But when one gets to the case of Georgia, it asked to come into the Russian empire in the late 18th century. And, you know, various other nationalities affiliated with Moscow and St. Petersburg in very different ways and times. I think we should look at each case and differentiate among them all. But the case is very clear on 4 of the 11 republics as to how we should stand on them.

In addition to Brzezinski's nine points, I would make one other policy recommendation. I think it would be terribly useful if the U.S. Congress invited Boris Yeltsin to come to speak and explain to you his four-point plan for increasing the sovereignty of the republics, avoiding civil war and disorder.

I have talked with a number of his staffers about it and, rather than sitting here speculating on our part, I think we could enhance his status as a leader and we could learn a great deal about what he has in mind and whether it makes sense to have a better and stronger relation, not only with the Baltic countries, but maybe with an increasingly independent Russian Government.

Thank you.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you very much, General Odom. I might say that—I don't know whether I mentioned this—we are hopeful and assuming we get a visa. That assumption is, I guess, 50/50 at best right now.

Lt. General ODOM. Right.

Chairman HOYER. One of the things we hope to do is meet with Yeltsin next week. We have close to 20 Members of the House and the Senate who hopefully are going on this trip.

It was interesting that when we talked to Mr. Burlatsky, who chairs the commission in the Supreme Soviet that interfaces with this one, he suggested that we also met with Gorbachev if we're going to meet with Yeltsin. We would be more than pleased to do that. Specifically, that was directed for the purpose that you have suggested.

Secretary Schifter, I thank you for staying with us.

Dr. Goldman, I'm sorry that I missed your testimony, and perhaps you spoke to the eight or nine points that Dr. Brzezinski raised.

First, let say that I was not one who necessarily advocated canceling the summit. I was one who advocated the position that when the President went to the summit, that he make it very clear, publicly and privately, the deep concern that this country has.

I, frankly, thought that would call more attention to it than canceling the summit, my rationale being that when you have a summit, the world's press is at the doorstep.

Canceling the summit gives a one-day press and some comment subsequently, but it seems to me the strength frankly of the previous administration, of which I was not a member of their party, was that the President was prepared to step up and say in a very public way "You are doing wrong. We disagree with it. It adversely affects our relationship."

And, certainly, we could talk to some of the South Koreans. They are absolutely convinced that's what made the difference.

And, of course, I perceive one of the significant roles of this Commission to be to speak out. As you know, I have spoken out, as well as other members of this Commission, very strongly on what has happened in Lithuania and have cited the vote in the Supreme Soviet, seven to one for invalidating not necessarily the incorporation, but the deal that led to it.

But, Dr. Goldman, you first. Were there any of those points that you disagreed with? Are there points that you would like to add? The reason I ask that, obviously, is that it seems to me they form a basis for this Commission to pursue; some of the points we have already been pursuing but even here we could strengthen our resolve to do so.

Professor GOLDMAN. Well, actually, I find that I don't always agree with him, but this time I agreed much more than Mr. Brzezinski said I was prepared to. Indeed, I thought all of these nine points were very good.

We should recognize those different republics by setting up a coordinating council similar to the one used in Taiwan.

It was announced today, if I'm not mistaken, that we have decided to send medical aid to the Ukraine for the Chernobyl victims and also food aid to Lithuania.

In some cases that's being done government to government. In other cases we have a host of private organizations like CARE, organizations like that, that could serve that particular purpose.

I think it's important, indeed, to give that form of recognition to the groups that have been set up in some of the republics and also

in some of the cities, in Moscow, the Moscow city authorities and the Leningrad authorities.

What I'm worried about in this is that Gorbachev has now set out to discredit any form of democratic opposition. That's very scary. Sobchak in Leningrad, Popov in Moscow, and Yeltsin, are all being accused of one thing or another.

I'm not sure I would want to invite him here. The reason for that is not because I don't want to show appreciation for what he has done, but I think that right now Yeltsin is being accused of being a toady of the United States, in particular, but to the West in general.

And he has gotten himself into a lot of trouble with the Soviet Army, the Russian Army in this particular case, because he's viewed as not standing up for the Russians, who are being abused, as they see it, in Lithuania and the other Baltic States.

It's a very tense issue now. We can't understand it, but for a Russian, this is a Russian against the people who are persecuting the Russians, as Russians are a minority.

And, in a sense, I hope you go there, have the hearing with Yeltsin, and convey the kind of impression that General Odom suggested that you do there. But if you invite him here, this will lead to the accusations that all he's doing is traveling around. Anti-reformers are making up itineraries of where these different people go, and they're paying too much attention anyway.

So let's give aid. We did give aid, after all, to Armenia during the earthquake. There's no reason why we can't do similar kinds of things that way as well.

Lt. General ODOM. Let me add one point to that.

Chairman HOYER. Certainly, General.

Lt. General ODOM. I am aware of the things you mentioned about what the Soviet military is doing, but more people are supporting Yeltsin among the senior military than you might be aware of.

And I think you could leave it to his judgment whether to come here. I would encourage the Commission to give him the option. And, therefore, I really strongly disagree that he not be invited.

I think you cheat him out of an option if you believe that you have a better view of what's secure for him than he does.

Professor GOLDMAN. I would accept that. But, I mean, I wouldn't feel disappointed if he doesn't come.

Lt. General ODOM. OK.

Professor GOLDMAN. Because I think that he may feel some of the criticism.

Chairman HOYER. I'm going to mark it of the three witnesses, two and three-quarters for the option.

The President in his State of the Union address incorporated a paragraph, which I was pleased to see, with reference to Lithuania and the action that had been taken there and in the Baltics generally, indicating that it was not our intention to punish the Soviet Union. I thought that was appropriate.

It clearly is not our intention to punish the Soviets. What we want to do is encourage the continuation of democratization and continuation of self-determination, particularly in those areas such as the four that General Odom mentioned, perhaps more, where we

perceive those peoples to be illegally incorporated in the Soviet Union.

I don't know whether either one of you spoke to that. I apologize. It seems that the President feels that it is a very thin wire he is walking.

Can you speak to that. My perception is that the Congress could perhaps be tougher in that regard and the administration, perhaps not?

What is your view of that as to how far the administration ought to go, can go, should go?

Professor GOLDMAN. Well, I, frankly, was disappointed with the statement that the summit wouldn't be held. I think Mr. Brzezinski, again, addressed that. There could have been back-room briefings and things of that sort.

It's inconceivable that Lithuania wasn't discussed. It's inconceivable that there wasn't pressure put on the Soviet leaders. We do respect Gorbachev. We didn't want to do anything to embarrass him.

But, at least, it could have been announced, as the President said yesterday in his press conference, that we're very worried. These are difficult times but we want to see how the thing works out.

I must also say that I'm also very concerned about where we go from here. I think we may have reached a peak, not only domestically in terms of the Soviet reform process in the Soviet Union, but also in terms of American-Soviet relations.

I greatly fear that there may not be a signing of the START agreement. We were told that we're just a few days away from it, that it will be held sometime in the first part of this year. If that were the case, why didn't we set a date, another date? I would have felt much better that way.

Now, in particular, we're even going back over the conventional arms agreement, that there is all kinds of concern, that there is cheating, and there is misunderstanding, and that they're putting weapons on the other side of the Urals, and they're classifying military, army units as navy.

I really worry now that that momentum has been broken, whether or not we're going to be able to make it up again. We may have seen the high point in American-Soviet relations.

It would have been difficult for President Bush to go to Moscow at a time of the Persian Gulf War, but maybe they could have met briefly to push this process further in Geneva or some other place. But, certainly, I think it was a mistake to cancel that.

Chairman HOYER. General?

Lt. General ODOM. An answer, a quick answer, to that I think the time for trying to make excessively subtle speeches to avoid difficulties has past. I think it became clear after the middle of last summer that Soviet policy is hardening in a number of areas. I think we're still trying to be too subtle about it, pretending it has just happened.

In the case of the Baltics, it's very clear. In the case of Russia and Yeltsin vis-a-vis Gorbachev, it's very clear.

Let me add one point. We ought not to get confused about what we're supporting. We may not be supporting democracy. After the

breakup, it may turn out that democracies collapse in all of these countries.

What we're supporting is national self-determination. We hope we're supporting democracy. And I support that national self-determination because I think that is a precondition for ever getting on with democracy. But I think if we keep putting the democratic goal up there, that we're deluding ourselves about how soon that can occur in some places.

The real question in the Soviet Union is; With the demise of communism, what will be the successor ideologies? They will be nationalism hyphenated with other ideologies, national socialism, national liberalism, national whatever.

Chairman HOYER. General, the irony of what you just said, I think, has to be noted. Perhaps already everybody in the room knows it. We, of course, have about a one-half million American men and women in Saudi Arabia——

Lt. General ODOM. Right.

Chairman HOYER [continuing]. And perhaps in Kuwait doing exactly what you just said, supporting national self-determination, not necessarily democracy.

Lt. General ODOM. Well, in my statement I made reference to that. I find a great moral irony in the level of indignation we raise in one case where the claim for popular sovereignty is not nearly as strong as it is in the case of the Baltic states.

Chairman HOYER. I made that point last week when we brought the resolution to the House floor—unfortunately, we didn't have as much attention to it, but a lot of attention to defending Kuwait. I'm for that and support our objectives there, and think we ought to be there and, certainly, I support the defense.

But it is somewhat ironic that three democratically elected governments, whom we perceive to be independent nations theoretically, if not de facto, as Dr. Brzezinski indicated, are not getting nearly the level of support and recognition from the White House and from Congress and from the American public as they should get.

Secretary Schifter?

Assistant Secretary SCHIFTER. General, with regard to the question of nationalities in the Soviet Union, let me just ask you: First of all, how do you assess the developments with regard to Ukrainian secessionism? Do you expect the Ukraine to prepare to secede?

Lt. General ODOM. The process in the Ukraine strikes me as one that would be terribly complex, and I don't know what it could eventually lead to. The intermingling of Russian and Ukrainian populations there is so great, having the dense Russian population in the cities surrounded by a predominantly rural Ukrainian population the dynamics would be difficult to anticipate.

You know, I don't think that you have to expect that all 15 republics in a nice, neat way with nice, neat, homogeneous populations are going to emerge as sovereign. I can't imagine an easy transition—and this is why I think Yeltsin would really be interesting to hear address the question.

He has thought out processes for degrees of autonomy all the way to secession for some states, not fully for others, and then

after they resolve some of their differences, perhaps forming a loose federation among several of them.

So, you know, that's their task to work out. I don't know the answer. But I don't rule it out anymore that such a transformation may occur. The Ukraine may just mark its border and say to Moscow, "This is ours. You stay over there." And they may build enough local military forces to defend their border successfully.

Assistant Secretary SCHIFTER. There are some who believe that while secessionist inclinations are strong in the western Ukraine, the further east you go, the less there is of it.

Lt. General ODOM. Right.

Assistant Secretary SCHIFTER. And further east, you have, indeed, the Russians.

In Yeltsin's concept of Ukraine, Russia, Byelorussia, does that stand, which is 60 percent Russian——

Lt. General ODOM. Right.

Assistant Secretary SCHIFTER [continuing]. Coming together or staying together? If that is the case, that's between 75 and 80 percent of the population of the Soviet Union.

So at that point aren't we really talking about sort of the dissolution of the Soviet Union? Why are we talking about some of the shrinking of the Soviet Union?

And the issue, then, is precisely what the federal arrangement is that can be made, if you get down to those four.

Lt. General ODOM. Those are perfectly possible scenarios you describe. I have no preference. I don't think we ought to dictate that. I think I ought to express strongly that the Soviet peoples, the various national groups within the Soviet Union, must work that out among themselves.

Assistant Secretary SCHIFTER. The point I'm trying to make is that as far as the likelihood is concerned, when we're talking about secession or independence, we're talking, really, about independence on the fringes of the Russian empire.

Lt. General ODOM. Well, it's not so clear to me. You know, I said yours is a possible scenario. A major separation is also another possible scenario.

By the way, some of the polling data from the eastern part of the Ukraine shows more enthusiasm for secession than the popular view in the Western academic circles would anticipate.

Assistant Secretary SCHIFTER. In the cities, but not in the county side.

Lt. General ODOM. Well, it should be the other way around because the Russians are mainly in the cities. So if they were mainly Ukrainians, you would expect them to secede.

If they were mainly Russians, you'd expect they'd be against it. Well, they're for secession. Maybe the Russians want to become Ukrainians. I'm not really sure.

But I remember in the resistance movements, the western Ukraine, right after World War II, the partisans had a practice when they captured Russian prisoners of sawing them in two. It gives you some sense of the intensity of their feelings along ethnic lines.

Professor GOLDMAN. If I may, Mr. Secretary, I'm dubious about the prospect of these four republics coming together. As soon as

Solzhenitsyn made that proposal, there was rioting in Kazakhstan, among the Kazaks in particular. And also the Ukrainians said, "That's not for us." And even the Byelorussians got themselves upset.

There have been, as you heard earlier, a series of agreements between different republics inside the Soviet Union, Yeltsin signing on the Russians with the Ukraine, Byelorussia.

One of the things they have discovered is they don't know where the borders are between the different republics. And so they've decided simply to let that go by the board and try to work out these other agreements with each other because they're so important.

I can see all kinds of splits. And we're seeing splits within many of the republics already. So I think the future is just a bit unknown except for one thing that I wanted to add.

When somebody asked Brzezinski a question earlier about the institutional groups which still are coherent, such as the KGB and the army, I would add one more. It looks like the Party is being born again. I wouldn't write off the Party yet.

And that's one of the scary things. That's one of the groups that immediately is putting pressure on Gorbachev now, particularly the Russian Communist Party, which really wasn't elected in any kind of democratic way, to say the least, but, nonetheless, it has coherence. It is putting pressure on Gorbachev. It is pushing him back or Gorbachev is acceding to it. But, in any case, they're undoing many of the things that were done.

And even going into the economics, I'm not convinced that the economic reforms that we have seen can't be undone. Indeed, some of them are already being undone.

We may be back seeing not what we saw under Stalin, maybe not as much under Brezhnev, but certainly much less than we have come to see these last few years.

Lt. General ODOM. I would like to agree with that point. If there was any detail in Brzezinski's presentation I have reservations about, it is his evaluation of the weakness of the Party. It has suffered a lot, but it is by no means dead.

Every traveler I run into who goes into the remote regions reports that the Party is still allocating housing space, vehicles, and so forth. All the resources are still being controlled by local Party officials.

Now, they may not have great ideological control, but they control the resources. And that turns out to be fairly important for their political vitality.

Assistant Secretary SCHIFTER. Let me suggest something to defend Dr. Brzezinski on this point. What I believe has happened is that the center Party has been dissolved. If you remove the center from the Moscow, there's no staff there anymore.

Lt. General ODOM. Right.

Assistant Secretary SCHIFTER. In the countryside, the Party still exists.

Lt. General ODOM. But I would simply observe on that point that in the late 1930's the central committee was purged.

Assistant Secretary SCHIFTER. I'm talking now about the staff.

Professor GOLDMAN. But I still don't like the law. I think that's——

Assistant Secretary SCHIFTER. Right.

Professor GOLDMAN. You know, just one other thing. I can't resist this because we're talking about a joint congressional visit. Take poor Gorbachev. He has created the Congress of People's Deputies, which is over the Supreme Soviet.

We think in this country that the legislature's function is to keep control over the executive, to make sure we don't end up with a king, to make sure that the legislature decides what the local taxation should be and the level of expenditures.

In the case of the Soviet Union, there is nothing comparable. They really haven't thought these things through. What has happened to the legislature is it has turned out to be a debating society without the ability to implement laws.

We have just seen the sitting of the Congress of People's Deputies. It debates and it adjourns. The next day Gorbachev announces an imposition of a 5 percent sales tax. That's what the legislature was supposed to have done.

But in a system where they haven't worked out these procedures, where they're trying to discover everything at once, it's very difficult to enact and enforce laws. And until they can find some way to control the executive, to give real power, not just debating power to the legislature, and to have something like a justice and a judicial branch, it's going to be very difficult to prevent excess accumulation of power by one means or another, whether it be Gorbachev or a successor.

Chairman HOYER. Dr. Goldman and General Odom, thank you very much for being with us. I think it's one of the best hearings we've had. Dr. Goldman has been with us before and has testified on a number of occasions that President Gorbachev shouldn't be around today. And maybe Marshall is just a little bit delayed, premature. You were ahead of your time perhaps.

But, as I said at the outset of this hearing, I personally think that what's going on in the Soviet Union now will have much greater ramifications than what's going on in the Middle East. We should not be totally distracted by that region and we're going to try to keep a focus on the Baltic States.

That was one of the problems with this hearing. Unfortunately, we were distracted by the close scheduling of Secretary Cheney's and General Powell's 2 o'clock briefing at the House and then at 3:30 p.m. by the Senate's trips to the Middle East.

So we were defeated somewhat, but I think the testimony was excellent and, I think, as a preface for us hopefully going this weekend to the Baltic States and then on to Moscow.

We're going to get this testimony distributed right away. And we'll have it available for the delegation going. Right now we have 20–25 Members signed up; that probably means we'll get 10 to 15, as the schedule looks so far. But if we get 10 or 15, that's a significant delegation.

Your testimony in total will be available to them because I think it will be very helpful in laying out the issues.

Thank you very, very much. We appreciate it.

[Whereupon, the foregoing matter was concluded at 4:10 p.m.]

APPENDIX

OPENING STATEMENT OF
REPRESENTATIVE STENY H. HOYER
CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY
AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

ONE YEAR AGO, PRESIDENT MIKHAIL GORBACHEV ADDRESSED THE PLENARY MEETING OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND, NOTING THE EXTENSIVE DEMOCRATIZATION AND INCREASING POLITICAL PLURALISM WHICH WAS UNDERWAY IN THE SOVIET UNION, FORESAW THE HISTORIC ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES.

AT THAT TIME, GORBACHEV APPEARED TO BE AIMING FOR NOTHING LESS THAN THE EMANCIPATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY -- THE ACHIEVEMENT OF CIVIC DIGNITY. A YEAR AGO, THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE WAS CHARGED WITH HOPE. COMMUNISM WAS WITHERING AWAY IN A MANNER AND AT A SPEED NO ONE PREDICTED, AND THE COLD WAR WAS DECLARED OVER.

ALTHOUGH GORBACHEV'S WORDS FELL AGAINST A SEEMINGLY LESS-THAN-PROMISING BACKGROUND, THAT OF A SOVIET STATE ON THE VERGE OF ECONOMIC COLLAPSE, GORBACHEV'S TANGIBLE POLITICAL REFORMS GAVE CAUSE FOR SOME OPTIMISM. AS VITALY KOROTICH, A MEMBER OF THE SOVIET CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES, WROTE IN AN OPEN LETTER TO HIS PRESIDENT, "WE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAVE NEVER, IN PEACETIME, LIVED AS BADLY AS WE DO NOW." BUT, HE CONTINUED, "OUR HOPES FOR A BETTER LIFE HAVE NEVER BEEN HIGHER THAN THEY ARE NOW." IN FACT, THE BATTLE FOR FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY IS FAR FROM WON.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS NOW SIGNALING A RETREAT FROM PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S EARLIER GOALS AND ASPIRATIONS. IN A MISTAKEN BELIEF THAT ORDER CAN BE GAINED BY DESTROYING LIBERTY ITSELF, INTIMIDATION AND FORCE HAVE BEEN USED TO USURP THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF THE GOVERNED TO CONFER POWER UPON THEIR GOVERNMENT. BUT ORDER AND STABILITY ARE MEANS TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY, AND NOT GOALS FOR WHICH DEMOCRACY CAN BE SACRIFICED. INDEED, AS ESTONIAN PARLIAMENTARIAN MARJU LAURISTIN RECENTLY NOTED, THE MOST STABLE PLACE IN THE WORLD IS A CEMETERY.

IN HIS OPEN LETTER, VITALY KOROTICH REMINDED PRESIDENT GORBACHEV THAT HE HAD ONCE INTERRUPTED A SPEECH BY ANDREI SAKHAROV ABOUT PEACE AND UNDERSTANDING. "NOW," WROTE KOROTICH, "SAKHAROV IS DEAD, AND YOU MUST FINISH THIS SPEECH AND THIS FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY." BUT IT WILL TAKE MORE THAN ONE MAN TO CONTINUE DR. SAKHAROV'S COURAGEOUS FIGHT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS: THIS BATTLE MUST BE FOUGHT BY MANY. THE PILLARS OF TOTALITARIANISM ARE CRUMBLING. IN THEIR PLACE, DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES MUST BE THE FOUNDATION UPON WHICH HUMAN DIGNITY WILL REST. NO HOME -- EVEN THE ONE GORBACHEV SPEAKS OF -- IS BUILT FROM THE TOP DOWN.

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STATEMENT
DENNIS DeCONCINI
CO-CHAIRMAN, HELSINKI COMMISSION
HEARING: THE USSR IN CRISIS
FEBRUARY 6, 1991

IT IS A GREAT PLEASURE AND HONOR TO WELCOME SUCH A DISTINGUISHED PANEL OF WITNESSES TO THE COMMISSION'S HEARING ON THE CRISIS IN THE SOVIET UNION. EVERY DAY BRINGS A NEW QUESTION ABOUT WHAT IS GOING ON THERE -- THE BALTICS, THE MILITARY PATROLS, THE CRUELTY OF THE NEW RUBLE POLICY, THE INCREASINGLY SERIOUS REPORTS OF SOVIET RESUPPLYING OF IRAQ. WE LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM OUR DISTINQUISHED PANEL THEIR VIEWS ABOUT THE STATE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND HOW WE IN THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BE RESPONDING.

GORBACHEV DESERVES GREAT CREDIT FOR THE TRULY REVOLUTIONARY REFORMS HE SET IN MOTION. I HAVE BEEN, NEVERTHELESS, INCREASINGLY DISTURBED BY THE VIRTUAL PERSONALITY CULT AMONG WESTERN GOVERNMENTS INCLUDING, I REGRET TO SAY, THE UNITED STATES, WHICH HAS DEVELOPED AROUND PRESIDENT GORBACHEV. THE PRESERVATION OF THE SOVIET PRESIDENT HAS BECOME SYNONYMOUS WITH THE PRESERVATION OF THE REFORM PROCESS HE SO COURAGEOUSLY SET IN MOTION. THE DANGER OF THIS POLICY BECAME EVIDENT WHEN GORBACHEV BEGAN MOVING AWAY FROM DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE WEST SEEMED UNABLE TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON HIM TO STAY THE COURSE OF REFORM. EVEN TODAY WE ARE TOLD THAT BEING TOO TOUGH ON GORBACHEV WILL ONLY STRENGTHEN THE HANDS OF THE SO-CALLED "HARDLINERS". BUT WHEN GORBACHEV'S ACTIONS MIRROR HARDLINE POLICIES, WE HAVE TO ASK WHOSE HANDS WE IN THE WEST ARE PLAYING INTO WHEN WE MUTE OUR RESPONSE.

SHOULD WE NOT BE MORE CONCERNED WITH STRENGTHENING THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRACY AND THOSE WHO ESPOUSE THAT COURSE? I FIND MYSELF WONDERING IF MANY LEADERS IN THE WEST HAVEN'T REPLACED THE OBJECTIVE OF PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE SOVIET UNION WITH THE DESIRE TO PREVENT CIVIL WAR AT ANY COST.

A SOVIET UNION IN TOTAL CHAOS IS A FRIGHTENING THOUGHT. BUT CIVIL WAR MAY HAPPEN WITH OR WITHOUT GORBACHEV AT THE HELM. INSTEAD OF GAMBLING WITH THAT UNCERTAINTY OUR POLICY SHOULD REFLECT THE PREDICTABLE -- THAT IS -- A STABLE WORLD ORDER WILL NEVER OCCUR UNTIL THE SOVIET UNION IS A DEMOCRATIC STATE. IT IS ESSENTIAL, THEREFORE, THAT THE UNITED STATES LET SOVIET LEADERS KNOW THAT WE WILL SUPPORT ONLY THOSE WHO BY THEIR ACTIONS DEMONSTRATE THEY ARE WORKING FOR REAL DEMOCRACY.

IN MY VIEW IT WILL BE A GREAT PERSONAL TRAGEDY FOR GORBACHEV IF HE IS NOT ABLE TO RETURN TO THE BOLD AND COURAGEOUS ACTIONS WHICH MARKED THE BEGINNING OF HIS HISTORIC ERA OF GLASNOST. BUT THE TRAGEDY FOR THE WORLD WILL BE IF WE IN THE WEST HELPED LOSE THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION IN THE SOVIET UNION BECAUSE WE TOO LACKED THE COURAGE TO PRESS FOR REFORM. THE TRAGEDY WILL BE IF WE IN THE WEST PLACE MORE FAITH IN GORBACHEV THAN IN THE SOVIET CITIZENS THEMSELVES.

STATEMENT BY REP. DON RITTER
CSCE HEARING: "USSR IN CRISIS: STATE OF THE UNION"
FEBRUARY 6, 1991

MR. CHAIRMAN, I WOULD LIKE TO JOIN YOU IN WELCOMING OUR EXTREMELY DISTINGUISHED GUESTS, WHOSE TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMISSION IS PARTICULARLY TIMELY. AFTER A COUPLE OF YEARS OF ROSY PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE SOVIET UNION AND UNPRECEDENTED OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION, THE SKY HAS DARKENED CONSIDERABLY IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS. TRENDS IN DOMESTIC SOVIET POLITICS AND UNMISTAKBLE SIGNALS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY GIVE US CAUSE FOR CONCERN AND STOCK-TAKING.

THESE DAYS INSIDE THE USSR, IT IS DIFFICULT TO FIND THE SILVER LININGS. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS SOUNDS LIKE SYMPTOMS OF A DESPERATELY ILL PATIENT WHO HAD DIAGNOSED HIS CONDITION, HAD PRESCRIBED MEDICATION AND WAS WELL ON THE ROAD TO RECOVERY WHEN HE SUDDENLY SUFFERED A DANGEROUS RELAPSE. THE RESURGENCE OF CPSU HARDLINERS, THE GREATLY MAGNIFIED INFLUENCE OF THE MILITARY AND HEAVY INDUSTRY ALLIANCE, THE SWEEPING NEW POWERS OF THE KGB, THE CRACKDOWN ON THE MEDIA AND GLASNOST IN GENERAL AND, MOST WORRYING, THE WILLINGNESS TO USE VIOLENCE TO KEEP THE EMPIRE TOGETHER -- ALL THIS IS SORRY AND SOBERING AFTER A YEAR IN WHICH THE PRINCIPLE OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT THROUGH ELECTIONS SEEMED DESTINED FOR UNHINDERED ADVANCES.

BEFORE 1990'S ELECTIONS TO REPUBLIC PARLIAMENTS, WHICH WEAKENED THE POSITION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND BROUGHT TO POWER PRO-INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS IN THE BALTIC STATES AND ELSEWHERE, GORBACHEV'S MOTTO WAS "A RULE-OF-LAW-STATE." NOW, AS ACTIVISTS MORE DEMOCRATIC THAN HE ACT ON THEIR CONVICTIONS, GORBACHEV APPEARS TO HAVE CHANGED HIS MOTTO TO "IF YOU CAN'T BEAT 'EM, BEAT ON 'EM."

AS FOR SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND SUPPORT FOR OUR GULF INITIATIVE, THE PICTURE IS LESS OBVIOUSLY BLEAK. BUT VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE REPORTS OF SOVIET AID GETTING TO IRAQ AND REFUSALS OF THE SOVIET DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT TO ABIDE BY ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS NEGOTIATED BY EX-FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE ARE DEEPLY DISTURBING. THE TRANSFER OF MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF EQUIPMENT THAT WAS TO HAVE BEEN DESTROYED TO EASTERN REGIONS OF THE USSR IS NOT WHAT WE HAD IN MIND. THE BIRTH OF THE "NEW

WORLD ORDER," IT SEEMS, WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT NOW AND MORE WRENCHING THAN WE THOUGHT ONLY A FEW MONTHS AGO.

CLEARLY, WE ARE AT AN IMPORTANT JUNCTURE. TOUGH DECISIONS AWAIT US. THE EXPERTISE AND EXPERIENCE OF OUR GUESTS WILL BE INVALUABLE IN HELPING US IN THE U.S. CONGRESS TO ANALYZE AND UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION IN THE USSR AND IN MAKING WISE CHOICES. I EAGERLY LOOK FORWARD TO THEIR REMARKS. I AM PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN THEIR VIEWS ON ESTABLISHING MANY MORE AND FIRMER TIES BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENT AND THE REPUBLICS. OUR MISSION TO THE BALTICS AND MOSCOW IS, IN PART, AN ATTEMPT BY THE CONGRESS TO BUILD SUCH RELATIONSHIPS. THANK YOU.

Statement of Edward J. Markey
Helsinki Commission Hearing on the U.S.S.R.
February 6, 1991

Thank you for calling this important and timely hearing on the crisis in the Soviet Union. There are a number of issues that I hope the speakers here today will be able to illuminate for us as we try to make sense of the economic and political crisis in the Soviet Union.

The most immediate concern for Americans are the military actions in the Baltic states. Does this represent a new turn to the right by the Soviet government? Could this shift in power also affect the many important arms control agreements that are on the agenda this year, particularly those that were on the schedule for the summit in February?

As we heard from Assistant Secretary of State Seitz in his testimony before this committee a few weeks ago, the United States would like to separate the issues of economic cooperation from national security concerns such as arms control. Unfortunately, it is entirely possible that a shift to the right in the Soviet leadership in terms of human rights and democratization may coincide with a shrinking commitment to arms control. If this is the case, perhaps our best chance for arms control is now, with the agreements of the Shevardnaze era still on the table.

Less dramatic than military confrontation, but perhaps more worrisome as an indication of future policy shifts, is the beginning of a Soviet government rollback from free enterprise. For example, the recent monetary reform and the authorization for KGB inspection of

foreign and jointly owned enterprises may crush any internal entrepreneurial spirit and will certainly damage interest and credibility among Western enterprises considering doing business in the Soviet Union. The loss of these connections to the West could have serious consequences for the future political and economic structure of the republics.

Ethnic populations in the Baltic states have suffered repression at the hands of the Soviets for over forty years. They are understandably impatient with calls for a slower transition to independence. However, in the move toward independence, the potential for nationalism to work against democratization and economic transition to a free market must be considered. United States policy must include a consideration of the following questions: Will nationalistic governments in the Baltics fully embrace democracy or will they limit or deny citizenship to the ethnic Russian population? And will the fact that a large number of businesses in the republics are owned by ethnic Russians lead local governments to resist or oppose the transformation to a free market?

One of the greatest challenges is to promote a form of independence and self-determination for the Baltic states which maintains a commitment to democratization and full civil rights for all minorities. A further challenge is to balance our disappointment and alarm over the resurgence of repressive practices by the Soviet government with the pressing need to move forward on arms control. It is my hope that we will be able to meet these challenges in the coming months.

Statement of Senator D'Amato

Mr. Chairman I commend the committe for calling this very important and timely hearing on the current state of the Soviet Union.

Unfortunately the prognosis for the Soviet Union is not good. Quite simply, the Soviet Union is in a desperate state of upheaval. From Vilnius, Lithuania, to the streets of Moscow, to the outer reaches of Mongolia, people of all ethnic nationalities are calling for

change, they are calling for real democratic reforms.

Mr. Gorbachev once the world's 'darling', has now lost control of glasnost and perestrokia. Inspiring words once signified hope and progressive change, but now signify economic failure and quite possibly the end of an era.

Mr. Chairman the outlook for the Soviet Union is not good. Just ask the people of the Soviet Union. They are totally disenchanted with Mr. Gorbachev and they are loosing faith in the West, which they feel is articificially propping up Mr. Gorbachev.

Why, they ask, is the West so enthralled with Mr. Gorbachev? Quite frankly, Mr. Chairman I can't answer that question, but I can tell you that I am not enthralled with Mr. Gorbachev. I was not enthralled with the military crackdown where 15 innocent people were either shot by Soviet paratroopers or run down by Soviet tanks.

I am not enthralled by a Soviet Parliament in which KGB and militray generals now dictate the course of Soviet political policy. I am afraid that the Soviet bear has come out of hibernation and we may soon be revisiting the days of the cold war, unless we act quickly to counter the reemergence of the

Soviet hardliners and the days of Joseph Stalin

Mr. Chairman, we must open new channels of communication with the people of the Soviet Union. We must begin addressing the leaders of the various Soviet Republics directly.

The most popular poltician in the Soviet Union today is Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian republic, the largest of all of the Soviet Republics. Boris Yeltsin now has the confidence and backing of the Soviet people, yet Mr. Chairman, we here in the United States barely know him.

I hope our distinguished guests will comment on their views of Mr. Yeltsin and whether the time has come for the United States to open direct channels of contact with the leaders of the Soviet Republics, the leaders of the democraticlly elected governments of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, so that the democratic winds which swept thorough Eastern Europe continue peacefully through the Soviet Union. Thank you.

HELSINKI HEARING
USSR -- State of the Union
Statement of Senator Harry Reid
February 6, 1991

In the last two years, we have seen great changes in the Soviet Union. The peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Republics are just beginning to learn freedom. They are just beginning to learn democracy.

They have acquired a voracious appetite for the basic civil liberties that we take for granted.

However, the Soviet ship of state is slow moving and doesn't easily change course. In recent weeks, it has sought safe harbor in its old and despotic ways.

Today, the Washington Post reports that President Gorbachev has declared as invalid a nonbinding vote on independence in Lithuania. In addition, intelligence reports suggest that Soviet generals may have skirted the INF Treaty by sending SS-12 missiles to Iraq.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to be optimistic. The changes initiated by President Gorbachev have gained such force



that they cannot be reversed. Yet hardliners in the Kremlin seem determined to do just that.

We are here today to try to understand what has transpired in recent weeks. And I look forward to the answers of our panelists.

The Decline and Fall of Mikhail Gorbachev and the Breakup of the USSR

by

Marshall I. Goldman

The Kathryn W. Davis Professor of Soviet Economics, Wellesley College
and the Associate Director, Russian Research Center, Harvard University
His forthcoming book is entitled What Went Wrong With Perestroika and will be published by W. W. Norton.

My wife tells me that it is terribly bad form to say I told you so, but today I can't resist. Four years ago next month, I appeared before this same committee and in a response to Congressman Steny Hoyer, I said, "My own prediction is that he (Mikhail Gorbachev) won't last four years."

Later that day, that same wife told me I should have said ten years becuuse by then everyone would have forgotten my prediction. After all, at the time Gorbachev seemed to be doing pretty well. Hardly anyone expected such a deterioration in conditions inside the Soviet Union. But even if Gorbachev holds out beyond next month, he certainly is a very different Gorbachev in comparison to the one we grew to applaud and cherish.

What explains the sudden rush backward and what does it imply for relations between the Soviet Union's Center and the republics?

First a brief explanation about Gorbachev's about-face. It would be inaccurate to call Gorbachev a democrat and market reformer. In his first few months as General Secretary, he lashed out at intellectuals who wanted more openness and exploration of the past. Similarly Gorbachev has emphasized several times that he is opposed to "private ownership with the right to sell land -- that I do

not accept." Prohibition of private ownership "incidentally is the tradition of our rural community."

Yet before revisionists have too much of a field day turning Gorbachev into a complete ogre, we would not forget that whatever is initial instinct, Gorbachev has nonetheless been open to persuasion. Perestroika and glasnost' were his programs. It is remarkable in fact how much he opened himself up to new and more liberal ideas. But ultimately he is a politician and after a time his job and the integrity of his country became more and more important to him and if that required turning his back on his friends and certain ideals, he would do so.

From Gorbachev's own words as well as those of his advisors we know a good deal about the behind the scenes discussions these last six years. In a remarkable speech Gorbachev has described the origins of his reform efforts. Walking along the beach on the Georgia seacoast in late 1984 with his fellow bureaucrat, Eduard Shevardnadze, Gorbachev has described how Shevardnadze broke the ice and acknowledged "that it had all gone rotten" - the Soviet experiment. By 1985 the two of them had concluded "that it was impossible to live that way." They came up with the concepts of "perestroika. . . more democracy and more glasnost' and more humanity. On the whole everything must develop so that the person in this society feels like a human being."

That was "a simple formula of life." The devil was in the implementation, especially in a society with over 100 different ethnic groups that had been repressed for almost 70 years. More than that combining glasnost and democratization with perestroika would inevitably set off an explosion -- it was a combustible mixture. The process of shifting from a planned economy would inevitably give rise to unemployment, inflation and income inequality, factors that were almost guaranteed to upset the public. That might have been alright in the past, but now the public was being told to speak out and criticize. More than that the man on the

street was being given the right to vote for his representatives for virtually the first time in Soviet history.

Under the circumstances it should have not come as a surprise to see that when the economic transformation faltered, there would be a loss in confidence in the center. This in turn was accompanied by a feeling that if left to their own devices, the varying ethnic groups at the periphery could do no worse on their own. In almost every case they were convinced that they could do it considerably better. Moreover if independent they would no longer have to subsidize the center and stand by as Moscow plundered their resources. The feeling was reciprocated by the Russians in the Russian Republic who complained bitterly about what they saw as the rape of their country in order to subsidize the periphery. It is the only empire that I know of where the cries of exploitation from the metropolitan center equal those of the colonies.

It is instructive to contrast Nikita Khrushchev's 1957 adoption of the *sovnarkhozy* (regional economic groups) with the rise of republic sovereignty and calls for independence that have now become a part of the Gorbachev era. The decentralized impact of the *sovnarkhozy* were a high point for most of the republics. They had more economic autonomy and they used it to improve their economic well-being. But given the continuing fear of the police and the army that prevailed at the time, few dared to raise the cry of independence or national rights. Those few who did were imprisoned or sent to psychiatric hospitals.

During the last two or three years however, different ethnic representatives began to sense that the center had become permissive, even encouraging the idea of more power to local groups. Unlike the Khrushchev era, this led to calls not only for economic but also for political independence.

Like the sorceror's apprentice who could not figure out how to contain what he had set in motion, Gorbachev began to find it harder and harder to maintain his

authority. In the old days the General Secretary could demand Party discipline from local leaders. This no longer worked. After all Gorbachev himself had decided to reduce the role of the Party. But even if the party had not been weakened, instituting secret elections forced local leaders to pay heed to local demands often at the expense of the center. Thus when the Lithuanians in 1989 became more and more restive, Gorbachev called the Lithuanian head of the Communist Party, Algirdes Brazauskas, and told him to rein in the local officials. Brazauskas replied that if he did, he himself would not be reelected and so he refused to accede to Gorbachev's demands.

Against that background the crisis which seemed to come to a head this past summer may be more easily understood. Recognizing that piecemeal solutions were contributing to the growing collapse of the economy, not rescuing it, several economists began an effort to come up with an all encompassing approach to reform. With initial support from Boris Yeltsin, this search for a more comprehensive approach was eventually joined by several of Gorbachev's own economic advisors. Together thirteen economists spent several summer weeks hammering out what eventually came to be called the Shatalin 500 Day Plan. Stanislav Shatalin, a Gorbachev advisor is regarded as one of the more thoughtful and knowledgeable economist in the Soviet Union. He commanded the respect of both Gorbachev and the overwhelming bulk of the intellectual community.

As the group struggled with its work, it received frequent input not only from foreign economic advisors, but from Yeltsin and Gorbachev themselves. By the end of August the plan was completed and from all signs both Yeltsin and Gorbachev had agreed to support it.

That is when the trouble began. When members of the military-industrial complex learned what was in store, they panicked. As described by Nikolai Petrakov, another former Gorbachev advisor, the leaders of the defense industries,

the army and "the red landowners -- that is the chairman of the state and collective farms" began to panic. These apparatchiks began to realize that the Shatalin plan spelled their doom. It called for budget cuts of 10% of expenditures for the army, 20% cuts for the KGB and 75% cuts in Soviet foreign aid. Moreover it called for the transfer of power to the republics, a breakup of the state and collective farms, a credit squeeze, and an end of state subsidies and the closing of unprofitable factories. By implication it also meant closing down or shrinking of most of the all-union ministries and planning organizations such as Gosplan and Gosnam. In addition it authorized the establishment of private property and the sale of land to individuals.

As Petrakov has put it, "The pressure began from the very first days of September." Rumors began to circulate of an impending coup. Armed troops suddenly appeared in Red Square in flak jackets on their way to we were told to "pick potatoes."

No coup in the traditional sense occurred; Gorbachev was not thrown out. But the effect was much the same -- Gorbachev shifted directions. Like a ship's captain caught in a hurricane, he desperately began to look for some way to salvage his ship. Having headed to the port side, he reversed course and lurched to starboard. He abandoned the Shatalin plan and opted instead for a more traditional approach -- one that if anything was a step if not two backward. Gorbachev's retreat was accompanied by a warning from Vladimir Kryuchkov, the head of the KGB, as well as others about the danger of too much reliance on the west and foreigners. They also complained of growing economic and political anarchy and secret foreign plans to restore bourgeois capitalist order in the varying republics. Others were critical of what they regarded as a disastrous foreign policy. Blaming both Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, these nationalists complained that all the gains of World War II had been lost. Look at what happened: Germany had been

reunited, Eastern Europe had ceased to be communist, and the Soviet military had disarmed unilaterally in a surrender to U.S. imperialism. And in a complete switch from the past, the Soviet Union had cast its vote for U.S. oil imperialism against the Soviet Union's traditional allies in Iraq. Finally at a raucous meeting in mid-November with military officers who had been elected to various positions in the country's supreme soviets, Gorbachev was told by Colonel Vil Alksnis, a co-leader of the conservative group of legislators called Soiuz, that "h had 30 days to impose order or face a vote of no confidence."

Abandoning his reforms and his former colleagues including Shevardnadze, Gorbachev proceeded to draft plans for increased presidential control and dictate. Some steps toward that end had been adopted in April 1990, but on December 1 the republics were told to comply with military regulations, especially draft call-ups for the army. On January 7, Gorbachev ordered airborne units into six of the republics that had been the least cooperative to enforce the draft. It was Shevardnadze's nightmare come true.

II

What does all this mean for the economic relations among the republics and between the center and the republics? Chaos of this sort has to be harmful. The drop of the Soviet GNP in 1990 was in considerable part due to the breakdown in the lines of communication and authority within the country. Orders from the center and Gosplan are increasingly disregarded. For that matter so until recently have Gorbachev's orders. Instead republics and for that matter cities are beginning to sign barter agreements with each other outside the control of the center. But as economists have long argued, barter is not an efficient process. Yet because of the

collapse in the value of the ruble, few are willing to take payment at ruble prices that are set by the center.

In this chaos it is hard to discern any common approaches. Some as in the Baltics and the Republic of Georgia want complete economic independence from the Soviet Union. The others, particularly in Armenia and Central Asia, want some cooperation with the state but on different terms from those that have governed in the past. For that matter there is even a sharp difference within republics. There are over ten autonomous regions in the RSFSR that want to claim their own autonomy not only from the center but from the RSFSR. They want control over raw materials and factories located within their area as well as the proceeds from the sales of locally produced products, especially when those sales are overseas.

Some lean to what they see as the inevitable and argue that the Soviet Union should transform itself into a federation or even a customs union. That is indeed what seems to be taking place, but it is not an encouraging prospect. It is not only that the Soviet Union seems to be out of step with the rest of the world where most countries are beginning to yield varying degrees of economic independence and sovereignty. It is also a little unlikely that after a rancorous divorce there will be much cooperation or selflessness. On the contrary, everyone seems to be making up for lost time and seeking to impose costs on their neighbors. Already many cities including Moscow and Leningrad have instituted forms of rationing which make it impossible for those from other cities to shop. Similarly the Ukraine has issued a form of its own money and the other republics are considering somewhat similar steps. In addition the Baltic states have already set up their own customs and tariff controls along their borders in order to restrict exports to neighboring republics.

What is needed is a solid, stable and acceptable currency. Before inflation the ruble more or less served this purpose within the Soviet Union. The collapse of the ruble however is a major reason why the flow of goods within the Soviet Union has

become so chaotic. If the republics move to full sovereignty, this problem will persist until they find some way to finance their trade. That may well mean developing fifteen new currencies or reestablishing a strong ruble.

The current state of the reform effort is not promising. It is not only that members of the military-industrial complex and Gorbachev have backed away from reform, but so have many of the republics. Partial efforts at price reforms have been rejected by Boris Yeltsin in the RSFSR and revoked by the Lithuanians. Most reform economists in both the USSR and the RSFSR have resigned their posts out of frustration and when Valentin Pavlov, the new Prime Minister, introduced a currency reform, he nullified what few benefits there were from his particular reform when he confiscated most of of the 50 and 100 ruble notes in circulation by refusing to accompany such a move with a badly needed price reform and market flexibility. And as we have seen, the army, the KGB and special police units have been used to enforce the center's will when the reforms look like they may be effective. And certainly the authorization given to the KGB to inspect all enterprise books including those of foreigners has to have a chilling effect on the move to any market-type activity. In addition the center can withhold exit and entry visas for those who show too much initiative. Equally important, Gosbank and the center can restrict the issuance of credit and hard currency.

III

We have some good examples of what can happen when the country begins to breakup and when the usual economic procedures cease to work. During an interview with Stanislav I. Lushian, the Director of the Institute of Finance of the Ministry of Finance in June 1990, I asked him who would collect taxes from the factories located in Moscow because Moscow city authorities were claiming access

to the taxes, as was Yeltsin and the RSFSR, and Gorbachev and the USSR. His answer was, "I do not know."

After the outbreak of war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in January 1990 the Azeris declared an economic embargo on all goods going into and out of Armenia. This meant that a tractor factory in Vladimir near Moscow could not take delivery on the tires it needed from its sole supplier in Armenia. In the taut Soviet economy there were no other tire manufacturers who could fill the gap and of course there were no wholesalers to secure supplies elsewhere. Supplying tractors without tires however does have its disadvantages. Ruptures of this sort are likely to grow if the Soviet Union moves to a breakup at the center.

Given the enormity of his task, the odds are that even if Gorbachev had chosen the right things to do, and even if the differing republics had held their national emotions in check, Gorbachev would still have had troubles. Of course neither condition occurred which makes it all the more likely that Gorbachev's tenure will be prematurely cut short. Against the background of failure future reforms will not come easy. It may well take a considerable time before Soviet leaders can build up enough credibility again to win the confidence of the Soviet people for yet another round of reforms. Gorbachev has given reform a bad name in the Soviet Union and it will take time to overcome that legacy.

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
by Lt. General (ret) Wm. E. Odom
6 February 1991

Good morning Mr. Chairman. I am honored to testify before this commission today.

You have asked me to address three large questions concerning the Soviet Union. First, who is charge? Second, what is the state of the police and military for use in repressing the forces of political change? Third, what are the policy problems posed for the United States?

Who Is in Charge?

The question of who is in charge has arisen, in my view, because of a failure in the West to understand the nature of the diffusion of power that glasnost and perestroika has caused. The short answer is "no one." Let me explain.

In 1987 I tried to discover the genuine aims and purposes of perestroika. Reviewing everything that Gorbachev had said or written by that time, I could not discover a clear answer. Many of Gorbachev's advisors and supporters

were clear. Some of them wanted to move to a market economy and liberal democracy. Other voices of glasnost wanted to return to a pre-1917 conservative multinational state, something like the old empire. Glasnost had not yet given full vent to the sentiments of the national self-determination among the non-Russian ethnic groups. Finally, a number of party leaders opposed systemic change in favor of retaining the traditional leading role for the party. Even this group, however, recognized that something had to be done about the economy.

Gorbachev's statements consistently gave something to almost all of these groupings, except perhaps the most reactionary circles of the right. While he spoke of a market economy, he always prefaced it with "socialist." While he revised the ideology, virtually eliminating any role for international class struggle, he left a residual place for it. On the national minorities issue, he virtually ignored it.

One does not have to be steeped in knowledge of Soviet politics to realize that a move to a market economy would involve a vast decentralization of control over resources. That diffusion of power would certainly allow the national minorities to contest Moscow's rule over their territories. Thus if one were to believe that Gorbachev truly intended to introduce private property and a market system, one had to

conclude that he was also willing to see the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The same argument might be made about his decision to allow reasonably free elections of a parliament, but the expansion of democratic participation did not bring the same danger as a market economy. The legislators soon discovered that they had no control of the USSR budget. Opposition political groups and parties also found that they lacked the resources to challenge successfully the Communist Party either at the local or central levels. They could make speeches and publish articles, but they could not significantly affect the allocation of resources.

The logic of this situation is fairly simple. For liberal reform to proceed very far, especially in the economic sphere, the Soviet Union would have to yield power to the republics. Gorbachev set sail in two boats with his perestroika program: liberal reform and the maintenance of the Soviet Union as a unitary state. Sooner or latter the two boats had to sail apart. He could only straddle for so long. Throughout 1990, it was clear that they were diverging.

The democratization campaign allowed the national republics to assert their demand for sovereignty. Those centrifugal forces probably made Gorbachev reluctant to move

rapidly to private property. The command economy with full state ownership has long been a major lever of control over the republics. The economic reform efforts of his advisors and supporters prompted great expectations while merely increasing the disorder in the old command economic system.

At the same time, the republics used the concept of "economic," as opposed to "political" sovereignty to challenge Moscow for control of resources. To a surprising degree, they have succeeded in influencing the diffusion of power to their advantage in this struggle.

A further factor in the diffusion of power has been the effect of glasnost on popular attitudes toward the ideology and authority. Marxism-Leninism offered both a sense of purpose and a justification for Moscow's rule over the national minorities. As the ideology has been more widely criticized and disavowed, both the purpose and legitimacy of Soviet rule have evaporated.

I spell out this process in some detail because it shows why a lot of Western attention to apparently pluralistic political development in the USSR Supreme Soviet is missing the key political change. Power has not drifted into the hands of either liberal or reactionary political factions in Moscow. Those groups have dominated the news and

the television, but the real shift in power has been to the republics.

No one is in charge in Moscow precisely because of these growing centrifugal forces in the republics. The most significant development in this regard has been the surprising role of the Russian republic. It is one thing for the Baltic republics to threaten to secede from the Union. Repressing them is quite feasible. It is another thing when the Russian republic threatens to secede. Repressing it is likely to be impossible.

The emerging role of Boris Yeltsin and the assertion of the Russian republic for more autonomy is changing the balance of forces. We are seeing a basic change in the attitudes of some of the Russian liberal intelligentsia. In their last chance for a central political role, in 1917 and 1918, the Russian Constitutional Democrats (i.e. the liberal party) backed empire against national self-determination, failing to realize that modern liberalism is incompatible with empire. Today, a number of Russian liberals are arguing that Russia has too long been shackled by the empire and that it must through off that burden. Yeltsin, it seems, have some sympathy with that view as well.

As Yeltsin has taken the mantle of Russian nationalism, he has transformed Soviet politics into a contest between,

if I may use a metaphor, "Saint Boris" of "Holy Russia" versus "Comrade Gorbachev" of the "Marxist-Leninist" Soviet Union. Yeltsin's dramatic exodus from the communist party and his personal identification with the Russian church carry great political symbolism. How this contest ends will determine the fate of the Soviet Union. Until it ends we can only guess "who is in charge" and update our guess each day with the latest news.

The State of Forces for Repression

If no one is in charge in Moscow, can anyone regain control? They certainly cannot unless reliable police and military forces can be brought to bear and the regional party apparatus revitalized. And who would "they" be? Gorbachev? Another party leader? A marshal? Let us treat these questions in order.

Are the security forces capable of implementing a crackdown? There is reason to doubt so. In his reform efforts, Gorbachev rightly understood that the economic burden of the Soviet military on the economy had to be reduced. To that end, he made unilateral reductions in Soviet forces. At the same time, in the fall of 1988, he permitted a public debate on military conscription. It gained enormous momentum as it was exploited by the national minorities to oppose the conscription of their youth, and

the larger publics of all the nationalities began to show pent up hostility to what they perceived as the military's privileged position. When the communist regimes collapsed in East Europe, forcing a more rapid transfer of Soviet forces back to the Soviet Union, there were no facilities to accommodate them and their families. Thus public discontent with the military leadership infested the lower ranks of the military as well as the civilian public.

The conjunction of all these factors has seriously undermined the morale and discipline within the armed forces. After the use of army troops to repress demonstrations in Tbilisi, army leaders were blamed for atrocities. Many reacted by stating publicly that internal stability is not their role. Russian and Ukrainian mothers took to the streets in January 1990 to protest their soldier sons being used to put down disorders in Baku. Meanwhile, open resistance to conscription has reached alarming levels, especially in the Baltic republics and in Georgia and Armenia where far less than half those called up appeared for service. Given these developments, the central authorities must have had great hesitation about risking the use of the army for repressing civil demonstrations.

Throughout 1990, the regime worked to create a limited number of reliable security forces. The MVD troops were increased. So-called "black beret" units were formed. The

airborne divisions came under KGB control. In other words, the year was spent trying to consolidate adequate military and police power to implement a crackdown. The appointment of Boris Pugo and Colonel-General Boris Gromov to head the MVD was a late step and a sure signal that the use of force would soon occur.

We have seen it happen in the Baltics. And we also seen a surprisingly successful popular resistance to it. Yeltsin came out against it, and most of the liberal groups in Moscow have decried it. The old fear is gone. People are not so easily intimidated as they were three years ago. Rather than lapsing into silence, editors and liberal spokesmen have condemned the crackdown. Most important, the Lithuanians and Latvians were not isolated but actually received more political support from the Russian republic than from the West! Once again, as in the past, Gorbachev has equivocated, appearing ~~the~~ to retreat, then promulgating an order for soldiers to assist the police in street patrols everywhere. That raises the real prospect of the end of the Soviet Union as we have known it in the past.

It is too early to predict the breakup of the Soviet Union, but we should not ignore the increasing probability of that outcome.

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Some observers have anticipated a military coup in these circumstances. Perhaps it will eventually be attempted, but it is unlikely. The Soviet officer corps is almost wholly composed of party members. In principle, an officer is a communist first, an officer second, and the behavior of officer delegates to the last party congress indicated that they truly accept the priority. The fusion of the military and party make it difficult to envision a military coup against the party. Military leaders certainly might support a reactionary party clique in trying to restore Soviet central control. If the generals seized power, they would have to invent the party again to maintain it. The anti-perestroika military voices do not speak of a non-communist alternative. They call for a return to Marxism-Leninism and party discipline. Officers who have become disillusioned with the party have joined the forces of liberal reform, e.g., Major Lopatin in the Supreme Soviet and Colonel General Volkogonov who is now Yeltsin's advisor. A military coup is hardly coming from the non-party direction.

In short, a military coup is unlikely as long as the party still exists, and its apparatus is alive today, even if it is besieged and declining. In a real sense, the military coup occurred when the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917. They were revolutionaries, and revolution is at root a military affair. Accordingly, building military power has been their highest priority ever since. For the Soviet

military to attempt a coup, as Major Lopatin said last fall, would be to attempt to overthrow themselves!

The more important thing to watch is the contest between the republics and Moscow for control over military means. Several unofficial military militias have already sprung up, but they could not defeat the Soviet MVD and army forces in pitched battle. The most important among the republican military developments is again in the Russian republic. Yeltsin has long courted the discounted junior officer ranks. More recently he has been making inroads into the senior ranks. His appointment of Colonel-General Konstantin Kobets of the Soviet General Staff as head of the RSFSR State Committee for Defense and Security, and his inchoate efforts to form an independent Russian army and KGB are bold and portentous moves.

If Yeltsin can win senior military support, then he will be able to dictate terms to Gorbachev and the Soviet government. It is difficult to imagine any outcome from such a development short of the transformation of the Soviet Union into a group of successor states, some of them perhaps remaining together within a loose confederation.

This is the military factor to watch, not the emergence of a military coup. The diffusion of military power among

the republics, coupled with the disintegration of morale and discipline within the armed forces, pushes the struggle away from a military coup toward a struggle for control over parts of the armed forces.

In sum, the state of the corrective forces is mixed. Signs of disintegration exist in the armed forces, but special efforts to build large and reliable MVD and KGB forces are also showing progress.

What are the Policy Problems for the United States?

There are many dilemmas and problems posed by these Soviet developments for US policy, but at root, the United States has to decide whether it wants to try to prevent the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the form we have known it. How that question is decided will dictate both the kinds of problems to be faced and nature of policy instruments to be used.

Before taking a position on that question, let me emphasize that US influence over Soviet developments is probably much smaller than we may believe. I seriously doubt that we can make the difference, either in keeping the Soviet Union whole or in facilitating its transformation. We should approach the issue with the utmost modesty and limited expectations. This is not to say, however, that we can have no impact. Out limited moral and political influence might prove critical at certain junctures, and we

could be facing one today with events in the Baltic republics.

The root question, whether to favor the maintenance or dissolution of the Soviet empire, has faced Russian liberals for more than a century. Liberal reform threatens to bring disorder, loss of control, and civil war because it releases long repressed social forces. Avoiding chaos and civil war means accepting empire and dictatorship. That has always been Russia's unhappy dilemma. Americans are now having to address that question along with Russian liberals. We cannot escape it. To ignore is, de facto, a vote in favor of empire.

If we truly favor liberal reform, then we must not fear the dissolution. National self-determination in Europe came long before liberal democracy, and it will not be different in the Soviet Union. The Union itself stands as a huge obstacle to liberal political and economic development. The collapse of the Soviet Union, however, will not ensure that liberal political developments will inevitably follow at once. They most probably will not. They did not in Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, nor in East Europe between the wars. The road to the modern Western liberal democratic political system was a long and bloody one. Can it be all that different in the successor states of the Soviet Union?

In some of them, it might. In others, the chances of liberal development are virtually nil.

From the viewpoint of American political values, it is difficult to support the continuation of Soviet power if the national minorities are against it. That would violate all our principles and foreign policy traditions since Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points.

I personally come down on the side of letting the centrifugal forces of self-determination win. That said, I do not advocate an aggressive US policy of promoting it. I see nothing wrong with taking a public and principled stand on the issue, but I also see no great need to brandish threats against Moscow and Soviet power.

There is one exception I would make to this restraint. The Baltics and Moldavia came under Soviet rule as the result of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. They were invaded and vanquished. Recently the Soviet government has allowed public discussion of the Nazi-Soviet Pact which led to its official rejection as an instrument of international law. Thus it is difficult to explain Gorbachev's refusal to grant them sovereignty and separation. One of the main thrusts of Gorbachev's foreign policy has been emphasis on international law and the United Nations. I believe, therefore, that the US should act fairly vigorously in the

political sphere to support the Baltic republics and Moldavia in their aspirations for independence. We should not be timid about our formal support, and we should applaud the brave stand taken by some of the Nordic states, particularly Norway, on this matter.

There is a certain irony to the US policy of using military force to retrieve the sovereignty of Kuwait, a state whose claim to popular sovereignty is marginal compared to the Baltic states, while sitting quietly as the KGB and MVD forces kill Lithuanian ~~and~~ citizens and the governments there cry out for our political support. The posturing moralism in our policy statements about Kuwait can only appear shameful when they are compared with our silence on the Baltics. This sharp contradiction not only reflects hypocrisy; it also undercuts our efforts to design a post-Cold War security order in which we propose to play an even hand.

The treaties and instruments of international law that brought the other republics under Russia's rule are much older, more complex, and more difficult to use as a guide for US policy. All of them are quite old, going back to the 17th Century in the case of the Western Ukraine. Some republics, like Georgia, actually begged for Russian protection in the 18th century. All of these cases are ambiguous in a legal sense, and they are complicated all the

more by Wilson's Fourteen Points which were cited in support of Polish, Baltic, and Finnish independence after WWII. Presumably they still have some validity today. It difficult in principle, therefore, to object to their claims of sovereignty even if they are not so legally clear cut, but our obligation to support them is weaker than it is for the Baltic republics.

To be sure, pushing self-determination to the extreme would be a very destabilizing policy in the world. Many small ethnic groups could assert it. That is why I take more ambiguous position on eleven of the fifteen republics. There are dozens of small autonomous regions within the RSFSR, Georgia, and elsewhere. We should not back their succession efforts, at least not today.

Are there good arguments for supporting Gorbachev in his attempt to keep the Soviet Union together? The two common ones are first, that he needs full control of the republics so that he can carry through his liberal reforms, and second, the chaos of dissolution might well lead to a major war within the Soviet Union that could spill over into Europe.

The first argument is wholly specious. Retaining the Union insures that liberal reform is not possible. Do we want to see a revitalized and strong Soviet dictatorship?

That is the only results such an approach to reform could bring, and even that is most unlikely because the Soviet system has proven incapable of economic revitalization. Those, like Professor Stephen Cohen of Princeton University, who accept Gorbachev's argument, seem to be as confused about the requisites of liberal reform as Gorbachev himself.

The second argument is more serious, and it gains some cogency when nuclear weapons are considered. On the whole, while I recognize the risk, I am favor accepting it. The alternative, a restored Soviet dictatorship, would be more of a military problem, not to mention a foreign policy problem. Successor republics certainly could not present the same challenge to world peace. Moreover, it is not so clear that civil war is inevitable. Yeltsin has already initiated a series of bilateral treaties with other republics to avoid such an outcome. The scheme may work. It will not prevent civil strife within several of the successor republics where smaller ethnic groups oppose the republican governments, but those wars are not likely to spread widely. Moreover, the Soviet regime has not been able to prevent such violence in any case, and some Soviet sources claim the KGB has actually provoked and inspired some of that violence.

Concerning nuclear weapons, our government should encourage that they all be moved within the Russian republics boundaries. I doubt that such encouragement will

really be necessary as it becomes clear that the regime is fragmenting, but being on record can't hurt.

If the United States and West European countries openly support the independence of the Baltic republics and Moldavia, the republics with an impeccable legal claim to sovereignty and separation, that policy will undoubtedly draw a negative reaction from Gorbachev and his government. How can the Soviet Union counter in a way that is harmful to the West? In other words, do we have a stake in the present course of Soviet foreign policy that is worth sacrificing our principles as they apply to these republics?

Yes, a number of adverse consequences are to be expected. There could be trouble with the completion of Soviet troop withdrawals from Germany and East Europe. Moscow could drop out of the UN coalition against Iraq. Positive trends in Soviet foreign policy toward the Far East could be reversed. And the prospects for arms control would dim.

Are these things worth risking? In fact, Soviet foreign policy has already changed to a less cooperative line in a number of these areas. It seems doubtful that CFE can be completed and monitored as a conventional arms control agreement in Europe. The Soviet side has recently thrown a number of surprising obstacles in the way. The

same is probably true for START. Voices in some circles in Moscow, especially military circles, are claiming that the USSR should not cooperate so closely with the United States against Iraq. They insist that Soviet interests in that region are being sacrificed to US gains.

In other words, there are signs that the adverse consequences of incurring Gorbachev's wrath are going to happen in any event. We might speed up the change in Soviet foreign policy by championing independence for the Baltic republics, but we are unlikely to prevent it entirely.

No matter how US policy responds, there is more than a little chance that Gorbachev will fail to bring the Baltics, Moldavia, and the Caucasus under control. In that event, we will be facing a new set of states in the old territory of the Soviet Union. Will it not be more difficult to establish good relations with them if we have been clearly on Gorbachev's side in the failed crackdown?

Given the chance that it does fail, does it not make sense to expand our contacts with the opposition leaders in the republics? Perhaps it is not yet time for our State Department to pursue such contacts vigorously, affronting the Soviet regime, but we have a number of other means. For example, it would be entirely appropriate for the US Congress to invite the heads of republican governments as

official visitors to Washington. The most urgent such an invitation is for Boris Yeltsin.

Yeltsin has not been to the United States on an official visit, and his private visit here was used by the KGB and Gorbachev to smear him. Given the present crisis in the Soviet Union, it would seem most useful to invite Yeltsin to speak to the whole or part of the Congress. The purpose of his speech should be to explain his own plan, a four point plan according to some of his aides, for proceeding peacefully to expand the sovereignty of the republics. Having that plan spelled out before the Congress could give us a better idea of what he intends and how to judge his seriousness and prospects for success.

Let me conclude by saying that US policy should seek to keep open as many options as possible. It should work to keep us better informed about political developments in the republics as well as in Moscow. It certainly should not be based on one personality in the Soviet leadership. Finally, it should not abandon our basic political values in dealing with this difficult situation, but it need not be unduly provocative to the Soviet government. Its influence at best will be small, and therefore, it should be framed to deal with a variety of potential outcomes in the Soviet Union, including secession by several republics.

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